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Abstract 
This thesis deals with the notion of shame and how it operates as a norm regulator for expressing 
masculinity and femininity, and, thus, forms constructions of idealised gendered subjectivities. 
As an individual experience, shame is mostly thought of as a negative emotion that debilitates 
and contributes to suffering. I examine how productive notions of shame can be understood as 
subjugating, but also transformative, for the individual in light of Foucauldian power and 
drawing on Manion’s work on moral shame. Further, I look at how shame experiences are 
gendered and, consequently, provide for gendered subjectivities and transformations. It is my 
aim to show that shame produces subjectivities and that it does so in a gendered way. Lastly, I 
examine shame and guilt in relation to morality, and how shame can at times falsely present 
itself as a moral regulator. I specifically look at gender when examining this.  




Denne masteroppgaven tar for seg skam og hvordan skam opererer som normregulerende i 
forhold til det å uttrykke maskulinitet og femininitet, og, dermed, konstruerer kjønnede idealer 
for subjektivitet. Skam er som oftest tenkt som en negativ følelse som svekker et individ og 
bidrar til lidelse. Jeg utforsker hvordan de produktive sidene ved skam kan sees som 
subjugerende, men også transformerende, for individer i lys av Foucaults maktbegrep og 
Manions arbeid med moralsk skam. Videre påpeker jeg hvordan skam erfares kjønnslig og, 
dermed, bidrar til kjønnede subjektiviteter og transformasjoner. Mitt mål er å vise at skam 
produserer subjektiviteter og at denne produseringen er kjønnet. Til slutt ser jeg på skam og 
skyld i forbindelse med moralitet, og hvordan skam kan på falskt grunnlag fremstå som 
moralsk. Jeg ser spesifikt på kjønn når jeg undersøker dette.   
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Introduction 
In this thesis, I examine the concept of shame. Further, I analyse shame through Michel 
Foucault’s1 notion of disciplinary power. I use his conception since it explains how this type of 
power potentially informs and regulates us from within. I engaged with this inquiry because I 
believe shame can have a highly negative impact on our lives. Growing up with a foreign-
sounding surname in the Norwegian countryside, I was at times shamed by other children.2 
Sometimes, I was called a “fucking foreigner,” or “jævla utlending” in Norwegian. Even though 
I had a happy childhood, this shame has periodically followed me into adulthood. Particularly, 
when I have experienced microaggressions.3 In many ways, the underlying message was that I 
was not a good person because I, apparently, was not Norwegian. It was not just my name; I 
was told, directly and indirectly, that I was stupid because of my gender. Even though it angered 
me, a part of me started believing it and as a result, I did not think I was smart enough to attend 
upper secondary school.4 Furthermore, it was during my bachelor studies that I realised how I 
have conformed to feminine gender norms. I still do, but now I am more aware of it. I realised 
that I tried to conform because I did not want to be an outcast, I wanted to avoid shame, I 
thought that it was connected to whether I was a morally good person or not.  
Feelings of shame and low self-esteem can contribute to exclusion in society. In the 
West, certain groups that historically were stigmatised and shamed, now receive higher 
recognition politically and legally. Legalisation of same-sex marriage is an example of this. 
However, political and judicial acceptance does not necessarily mean an absence of shame. 
Being queer, I never had a coming out process because I did not feel a need for it. I am not 
ashamed of my sexuality, but I keep being introverted in this regard. Specific ideas of what it 
means to be queer, such as having a coming out process and needing to be loud and proud, 
made me question if I was indeed queer. On occasions, others have questioned my sexuality 
 
1 French historian and philosopher. 
2 One specific incident that stands out was when I was swimming at the local lake with some friends and some 
older boys splashed water on me while calling me a “fucking foreigner.”  
3 For instance, when I was renewing my membership at a gym once, my gym card did not work. When I called in 
to fix it, we realised that my name was incorrectly spelled. My reply was a simple “ah yes, that can happen” 
because I am used to that happening and saw it as a quick fix. The response I received was “you cannot 
expect us to know how to spell the names you people have.” Norwegian peers have also told me that I am 
exotic when they hear my surname.  
4 Fortunately, I also had people around me who encouraged me to apply to United World College for the last two 
years of upper secondary school. There, I met friends who told me I was smart and could apply for a 
bachelor’s programme where I met people who encouraged me to apply for a master’s degree. I was 
fortunately easily convinced when it came to a master’s degree even though I have had my doubts while 
writing this thesis. Without these people insisting that I give it a try and that I am smart enough, I do not 
know if I would be writing this thesis.  
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because I did not conform to their idea of queerness. Through these instances, I have felt like a 
fraud and ashamed of not being “queer enough.” Thanks to the psychology classes I took that 
had feminist perspectives, I learnt that I was not the only one who felt that I did or did not live 
up to societal ideals or standards and wondered how this was connected to me as a morally good 
person. I wanted to learn more about this from a philosophical perspective, so I decided to 
analyse shame’s disciplinary power in a gendered perspective in this master’s thesis. I do 
recognise positive aspects of shame. Therefore, I also explore how shame can be beneficial.  
In relation to Foucault’s disciplinary power, I examine how it is a force that produces 
and regulates subjectivities. Here, I analyse how we experience who we are in relation to 
normative ideals. By normative ideals, I mean standards of being that are valued by the 
communities we participate in; standards that we, supposedly, ought to strive for and embody 
and we communicate through norms. I study how we convey our subjectivities to the people in 
our shared social practice through shame, how we express ourselves and behave in specific 
ways to try to show that we embody the ideal or at least we are working to achieve it. 
Specifically, I focus on how these forms of expressions and behaviours are gendered. A 
gendered expression might be the type of clothes you wear or how you work to change your 
body in accordance with masculine or feminine body ideals. A gendered behaviour can also be 
how you act out your sexuality. I argue that shame as a disciplinary force contributes to 
regulating these gendered expressions and behaviours in accordance with societal norms of 
what is the standard or valued ideal. To illustrate, we often hear about young adults with eating 
disorders, high rates of depression, and low self-esteem because they do not feel thin, strong, 
feminine, or masculine enough. A disproportionate number of people worldwide feel 
inadequate in light of their respective society’s definition of masculinity and femininity, which 
has a debilitating effect on their lives. When you fail to live up to those ideals, you might feel 
ashamed of who you are because you might be seen as an outsider of the social group. To stop 
feeling shame, or to avoid feeling shame altogether, you might try to regulate your behaviour 
or your expressions so that others, and you, see yourself as feminine or masculine enough.  
Moreover, I critically evaluate how our gendered ideals are falsely given a moral value 
thus reinforcing a regulation of our gendered subjectivities. I identify how shame has moral 
relevance, but also how we mistake shame’s social regulation for moral regulation. In doing so, 
gendered ideals can seem beneficial for specific social regulations. Further, I look at how falsely 
portraying gendered ideals as moral reinforces the social regulation of gendered ideals. To 
illustrate, a society that focuses on reproduction of children might proclaim that women ought 
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to stay at home while men are out working. In this society, people might shame each other as a 
means of social control and regulation if you step outside of the role assigned to women or men. 
Further, in this society, the different roles of man and woman can be used as a justification to 
state that what it means to be a good person varies depending on your gender. Such society 
might say that a woman is morally good if she stays at home to nurse the children into adulthood 
because this would be in line with the ideal of what a good woman is, and that a man is morally 
good if he is working and provides for his family. Here, adding a moral aspect to who we are 
as men and women, can reinforce the social regulation since we want to be good human beings. 
In such a way, I will sustain how gendered ideals of what it means to be a good woman or a 
good man are falsely given moral value.   
 
Concepts and Central Perspectives 
This thesis inscribes itself in the fields of phenomenology, moral psychology, gender theory, 
and feminist philosophy. It discusses within the field of phenomenology because I look at how 
we experience shame. It is within moral psychology because I examine how we internalise 
moral ideas and develop a sense of moral self through shame and disciplinary power. Further, 
this thesis is within gender theory because I explore how gendered subjectivities are produced 
and regulated through shame and disciplinary power. Lastly, my thesis has a feminist 
perspective in my exploration of how gendered subjectivities are produced.  
 I examine shame in relation to guilt because shame and guilt are feelings that often occur 
simultaneously. When differentiating shame and guilt, I use Gabriele Taylor5 and Sandra Lee 
Bartky.6 They are similar in their definitions of guilt, but they disagree when it comes to shame. 
They both argue that feelings of guilt occur when you did something forbidden. Taylor argues 
that you have to agree with the shamer’s, or audience of your shame, values to feel shame. This 
view is supported by Dan Zahavi.7 Bartky argues that you do not have to agree with the 
shamer’s values to feel shame. Cheshire Calhoun8 agrees with Bartky and adds that a shared 
moral practice with our peers can explain why we feel shame even if we disagree with the 
shamer. I discuss the arguments for and against having to agree with the shamer’s values to feel 
shame, and submit to Barkty and Cheshire’s view that you do not have to agree with the shamer 
 
5 British philosopher that focuses on moral psychology and ethics.  
6 American philosopher that focused on phenomenology and gender studies.  
7 Danish philosopher that focuses on phenomenology. 
8 American philosopher that focuses on moral psychology, ethics, and philosophy of emotion. 
Page 8 of 76 
 
to feel shame. Then, I illustrate how we internalise the values of the shamer, even when we do 
not necessarily agree with them. This is an important aspect, because feeling shame without 
agreeing with the shamer can make us more prone to shame’s regulatory force than we might 
be aware of.  
 I use Zahavi to analyse shame’s social and isolating characteristics. Specifically, I 
engage with aspects pertaining to the integration and learning of social norm when exploring 
the social characteristics. Regarding shame’s isolating characteristics, I look at how you might 
feel excluded and alone if you deviate from the social norms. Regarding my hypothesis, I argue 
that Zahavi’s social and isolating characteristics of shame contribute to disciplining us as 
individuals.  
 With respect to disciplinary power, I examine Michel Foucault’s notion of power as 
productive. Traditionally, power is regarded as a force administered by an authority upon its 
subjects. Power is often considered a relationship between the powerful and the powerless. 
Foucault brings in a new perspective on power when he connects it to notions of disciplinary 
production of bodies, knowledge, sex, and subjectivities. Through his genealogical study of 
power, he brings forth a new perspective that focuses on power as discourse and an omnipresent 
force. For instance, he looks at how different power relations throughout history influence truth-
knowledges.9 According to Foucault, power is a relation and not a thing; power is exercised in 
a network of relations and not necessarily a thing that is possessed.10 When power is exercised 
in a web of relations, power can come from anywhere. It can come from the doctor, the school, 
a friend group, or through media messages. Power and knowledge are intertwined in their 
relation, so when knowledge is produced so is power, and vice versa. I examine how power and 
knowledge are discursive in that there are ways of speaking that allow for certain statements to 
be expressed.11 I look at how power and knowledge regulate which subjectivities we can 
express, and how power and knowledge are disciplinary in their regulation. I analyse shame in 
relation to Foucault’s notion of power in how shame can regulate which statements, ways of 
being, or subjectivities are considered appropriate. Instead of shame being between the 
powerful and the powerless, I look at how shame can come from a network of relations and 
contribute to knowledge production and what we consider as true ways of expressing 
 
9 Foucault specifically focuses on Western from 17th century to mid-20th century, and Roman and Greek 
antiquity.  
10 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin 
Group, 1991) 
11 Claire O’Farrell, “Key Concepts,” Michel-Foucault.com, 2007, last modified October 30, 2010, 
http://www.michel-foucault.com/concepts/ .   
Page 9 of 76 
 
subjectivities. I use Barkty to look at how feminine bodies are produced differently compared 
to masculine bodies. Even though I agree with Bartky, I also think of feminine bodies outside 
of the female body. I use Judith Butler12 when exploring feminine bodies outside of the female 
body. I briefly examine her concept performativity in relation to shame as disciplinary power. 
I use Butler to look at the way in which we perform our gender and how we experience shame 
regulates our subjectivities.  
 Shame can vary according to gender. I use Bartky to understand if feelings of shame 
vary according to gender; if the same setting might make a woman feel shame but not a man, 
and I support her claim that feelings of shame can vary depending on gender. I also use Ullaliina 
Lehtinen13 when investigating gender and shame. I look at how she differentiates between two 
types of gender-specific shame, aristocrat and underdog, and how she argues that men and 
women, respectively, experience them. I challenge her arguments by examining if gender-
specific shame can be intersectional depending on power relations. I examine this 
intersectionality to see if there are situations where women might feel aristocrat shame and men 
underdog shame. 
 I use Jennifer C. Manion14 when I examine shame’s beneficial characteristics. I examine 
her argument that shame can instigate a transformation of an individual. She argues that shame 
can force you to self-reflect on what values you have internalised and whether you agree with 
these values. I look at how such self-reflection and transformation can contribute to a wider 
range of gendered subjectivities where men and women are not restricted to masculine and 
feminine expressions, respectively. I find Manion’s transformative notion of shame to be crucial 
because it can contribute to overcoming shame’s debilitating aspect, furthering moral 
development, and breaking gender norms. 
I examine shame and guilt in relation to morality to explore where they might have 
moral relevance. I examine responsibility and honour as moral notions. I look at how R.E. 
Lamb15 examines whether shame or guilt is morally relevant when he explores responsibility 
as a central moral notion. Further, I use Anthony O’Hear16 as a contrast to Lamb since O’Hear 
explores honour as a moral concept. I examine ways in which responsibility and honour might 
account for moral guilt compared to moral shame. I also examine what type of moral 
 
12 American philosopher who focuses on feminist philosophy, political philosophy, ethics, and gender theory. 
13 She is Swedish and employs an epistemological and feminist perspective in her work on shame. 
14 She is American and focuses on feminist philosophy and gender theory in her philosophical work. 
15 He focuses on phenomenology and moral philosophy.  
16 British philosopher who focuses on moral philosophy and philosophy of mind.  
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information we get from shame and guilt. Here, I examine Jan-Olav Henriksen 17and Terje 
Mesel’s18 claim that shame ought to have minimal space. However, I also examine how they 
can claim that shame ought to have minimal space in society when they also recognise shame’s 
positive aspects, like that of Manion’s transformative power of shame. In light of this I examine 
how shame can, at times, present itself as a false moral regulator, specifically regarding 
gendered subjectivities.  
 
Chapter Overview of the Thesis 
In the first chapter, I distinguish between shame and guilt. However, I focus on the former. I 
argue that you do not have to agree with the shamer’s values and ideals to feel ashamed and 
that the shamers do not have to be present physically or imaginary to feel shame. Then, I look 
at how shame influences our social relationships as it can motivate us to act normatively to feel 
included. As feelings of shame can separate us from others by making us aware that we are not 
like the rest of the social group, acting in such a way can still be isolating. I explain some of the 
beneficial aspects of shame. For example, it can protect the self and motivate integration and 
self-growth through its transformative power. Lastly, I focus on gender-specific characteristics 
of shame by looking at experience-based shame and episodic shame. I use Bartky and Lehtinen 
when examining gender-specificity to shame.  
In the second chapter, I explore Foucault’s notion of power, knowledge production, and 
subjectivity. By looking at how shame relates to the exercise of power and knowledge and 
contribute to forming subjectivities, I argue that the knowledge produced through shame can 
function to inform individuals’ behaviour within the social body. Thus, shaming informs 
through surveillance by the other, imaginary or real, and contributes to self-regulating our ways 
of being to fit the standardised body. Via Foucault’s Scientia Sexualis, I analyse how it 
contributed to new discourses on sexual subjectivity. I demonstrate shame’s shared 
characteristics with Scientia Sexualis, including the importance of confessions to gather 
information when we feel ashamed and how that information reinforces a truth about sexual 
subjectivities by exploring abnormalities. I take an intersectional approach to sexual 
subjectivity so as to argue that shame varies depending on gender, sexuality, race, and social 
class. Lastly, I argue that women and men can have different corporealities in light of how they 
 
17 Norwegian theologist who focuses on philosophy of religion. 
18 Norwegian theologist who focuses on ethics and health care.  
Page 11 of 76 
 
might be subjugated differently and how that influences gendered expressions of subjectivity. 
I use Bartky and Judith Butler when examining gendered expressions of subjectivity.   
In the third chapter, I explore moral aspects of shame and guilt and argue that shame 
has moral relevance since guilt cannot account for all aspects of morality. I use R.E. Lamb to 
explain responsibility as a moral notion and its relation to shame and guilt. Lamb argues that 
only guilt is essentially connected to morality, and shame is only contingently related to 
morality.19 I then explore honour as a notion of morality. Anthony O’Hear argues that honour 
has an aspect of shame that guilt does not necessarily have.20 To challenge O’Hear, I argue that 
honour can also have elements of guilt. However, I also argue, along with O’Hear, that moral 
shame can provide an internal motivation for our behaviour. Next, I examine Henriksen and 
Mesel’s argument that shame ought to have minimal space in human societies because shame 
cannot necessarily show us what or why something is wrong, only that something is wrong.21 
Further, I explore how they can claim that shame can have a minimal space when recognising 
that shame can be positive through Manion’s argument that shame can be transformative. 
Lastly, I examine if and how moral shame shapes normative ideals of gender as a regulation of 
subjectivity’s expression. I argue that shame can, especially regarding gender, falsely present 











19 R.E. Lamb, “Guilt, Shame, and Morality,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43, no. 3 (1983), 329-
346. 
20 Anthony O’Hear, “Guilt and Shame as Moral Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1976-
1977) 
21 Jan Olav Henriksen and Terje Mesel, Shame’s Unwelcome Interruption and Responsive Movements. Body, 
Religion, Morality – an Interdisciplinary Study (NOASP, Cappelen Damm Akademisk, 2021), 336. 
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Shame, Guilt, and Gendered Experiences 
My master thesis deals with the notion of shame and how it shapes normative ideals of 
masculinity and femininity as a regulation for expressing subjectivity. Internalised societal 
norms of what ideals are to be achieved by boys and girls, men and women, can evoke feelings 
of shame in a person. Particularly when you break social norms and feel that you do not live up 
to the ideals and expectations constructed by society. As such, shame becomes a productive 
notion of subjectivity. I draw on a Foucauldian notion of productive power here, where shame 
is productive in how it manufactures and disciplines what form of subjectivity is considered 
appropriate and legitimate. 
Shame is often associated with “a painful, sudden awareness of the self as less good 
than hoped for and expected, precipitated by the identification of others (imaginary or real), or 
simply by the ashamed self, of a seemingly significant character shortcoming[;]”22 the person 
does not measure up to a certain standard or ideal. Such notions of shame are thought of as 
debilitating for the individual as the subject is in a state of suffering. However, regardless of 
how a person is weakened in a shamed state of being, I argue that a person is also informed of 
how to act through subjugation where only certain forms of expressing subjectivity are 
approved of. Further, I argue that what are considered the appropriate forms of expressing 
subjectivity are gendered. What are often considered legitimate forms of subjectivity for males 
are ideals connected to that which is traditionally linked with masculinity and activity, and 
females' legitimate forms of subjectivity are often connected to that which is traditionally linked 
with femininity and passivity.23  
 In this chapter I will, first, briefly distinguish between shame and guilt, as the two are 
often present simultaneously and can therefore be confused in their characteristics. I will then 
 
22 Jennifer C. Manion, “Girls Blush, Sometimes: Gender, Moral Agency, and the Problem of Shame,” Hypatia 
18, no. 3 (2003): 21. 
23  I say “traditionally” because you find such associations amongst the Ancient Greeks (see Michel  Foucault, 
The Use of Pleasures. History of Sexuality: Volume Two, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, CA: Penguin Group, 
2006) 84; specifically, “…immoderation derives from a passivity that relates it to femininity.”), in much of 
Chinese philosophy on yin, associated with femininity, passivity, submissiveness, etc., and yang, associated 
with masculinity, activity, dominance, etc. (see Mark Cartwright, “Yin and Yang: Definition,” Ancient History 
Encyclopedia, Nov. 26, 2012; http://www.ancient.eu/Yin_and_Yang/ ), and more recent work like that of Adie 
Nelson (see “The Pink Dragon is Female: Halloween Costumes and Gender Markers,” Psychology of Women 
Quarterly 24 (2000), 137-144). Further, I also say “traditionally” because there is also a body of work that 
challenges such notions of femininity (see, for instance: Amy C. Wilkins, “‘So Full of Myself as a Chick:’ Goth 
Women, Sexual Independence, and Gender Egalitarianism,” Gender and Society 18, no. 3 (2004), 328-349; 
Jessica L. Willis, “Girls Constructing Identity and Transforming ‘femininity:’ Intersections between bmpirical 
and theoretical understandings of 21st century girlhood” (Dissertation, Clark University, 2008)).  
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elaborate on the notions of shame in relation to the debatable importance of a group's views and 
values, and the transformative power of shame. Finally, I will draw on the work of Ullaliina 
Lehtinen and go further into a gendered account of experiences of shame.  
  
Shame and Guilt 
My project concerns shame as a norm regulator for expressing gendered ideals of subjectivity. 
In order to argue why shame operates as a norm regulator, I first need to discuss shame and 
some of its different manifestations. In this discussion I will draw on Gabriele Taylor because 
of her focus on shame as an emotion of self-assessment. Shame as an emotion of self-
assessment is relevant for my thesis because norms become internalised and play an important 
role in determining our social interactions. Shame is a method of assessing the self in relation 
to these norms. I will use the works of Sandra Lee Bartky because she introduces a gendered 
aspect to shame. Further, Both Bartky and Cheshire Calhoun show that a person does not have 
to agree with the audience’s views and values to feel shame in a public or private situation. The 
audience can be both imaginary and real to induce shame. This stands in contrast to Taylor, 
who believes a person must agree with the audience to feel shame. By comparing these 
viewpoints, I intend to show that even though norms of idealised subjectivity are internalised, 
we do not have to agree with the internalised ideal of how we ought to express our subjectivities. 
I will also highlight a gendered aspect to these idealised subjectivities. It is not necessary that 
the gendered norms of subjectivity are internalised, in order to feel shame. When viewing shame 
in its pervasiveness in regulating norms of subjectivity – where we can feel shame, despite 
disagreeing with or lacking the internalised views and values of those we engage with in society 
– I think we can open for a discussion on shame as a Foucauldian notion of power. I will go 
into this discussion in chapter two. First, an account of shame and guilt. 
In her book Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment, Taylor classifies 
shame as occurring when an individual is, in the audience's view, deviating from a norm when 
the individual agrees with the audience's view. Bartky characterises shame similarly to Taylor 
when she highlights in Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of 
Oppression that: “When you lack what you do not want, there is no shame.”24  An audience 
does not actually have to be physically present to induce feelings of shame, it is enough for the 
 
24 Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 1990), 90. 
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person to think of herself through the eyes of the audience for shame to occur.25 Taylor 
characterises guilt, on the other hand, in the context of legality. Feelings of guilt occur when a 
person accepts that he or she did something forbidden and accepts the authority that forbade the 
action.26 A punishment to reprimand the guilt is, therefore, in response to a person's actions 
rather than his or her character.27 What is troubling with this statement is that sometimes action 
can be linked to a person's character which, in turn, shows that it is difficult to separate shame 
and guilt absolutely. A person who is virtuous in character acts more virtuously than a person 
who is vicious in character. However, a person who does more virtuous acts can also become a 
person who is virtuous in character. Whether our actions make up our character change or not 
are ontological questions which I will not try to answer here. I bring them up merely to show 
that the potential answers to these questions challenge the characteristics and our definitions of 
shame and guilt.  
Taylor further claims that a form of repayment is due in relation to guilt: “If I have done 
something wrong then there is some way in which I can make up for it, if only by suffering 
punishment,”28 but she claims this is not the case for shame. I am hesitant to agree with Taylor 
on this point because there are cases when you are shamed by someone, and feel shame because 
of it, but can make amends to alleviate your shame. However, perhaps Taylor thinks that 
repayment and punishment are necessarily linked with guilt, while they are not necessarily, but 
sometimes linked with shame. She does not make any clarification on this, so I am only 
speculating what she might think. I am again hesitant to agree if she does indeed think that. 
There are cases where individuals feel guilt, whether guilt is perceived as the appropriate feeling 
or not. For instance, a person, Sally, who was raised to believe that it is a sin against God's law 
to masturbate is caught masturbating by someone who does not believe it is against God's law. 
Sally feels guilty about committing a sin against God's law and wants to apologise (as a 
repayment for her sins), promising to go to confession to help her refrain from masturbating.29 
The other person, however, sees belief in God and masturbation as compatible, and does not 
see the necessity of any form of punishment or repayment.  
 
25 Gabriele Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment (New York, USA: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), 57. 
26 Ibid., 85. 
27 Ibid., 89 
28 Ibid., 90. 
29 There will most likely also be an element of shame present, but I will come back to a more detailed 
discussion on shame later. The presence of shame simultaneously with guilt further highlights the 
entanglement of shame and guilt. 
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Instead of being punished or repay for one's actions, it could be that changing the view 
on the law, where one still accepts the authority of the law (i.e., God), is also an option. It must 
be noted, though, that Taylor does not specify what law she is referring to. It could be that she 
only means judicial law, but it seems that would mean a rather narrow understanding of guilt. 
The expression “Catholic guilt” in Catholic societies, seems to be an indicator that guilt does 
not only occur if one breaks the judicial law enforced by an authority which a person accepts. 
An authority that enforces a law can be found outside of the judicial system, such as the family 
and religion, and I do not think Taylor would deny the authoritative roles of family and religion 
in the lives of many individuals. If Taylor would not deny such a claim, then her earlier claim 
that repayment and punishment are necessary components of guilt would not necessarily hold 
true. Sometimes we feel guilt when we break rules (or laws) in our family. For instance, my 
younger brother once texted his mother for permission to go to the lake, but she said no. He 
then texted his father for permission and received a “yes.” It was not specified in the text that it 
also had to be okay with his mother, but it was later, for obvious reasons, revealed that it was 
implied. Later in the day his mother and father realised what had happened and my brother felt 
guilty for going against their “law.” His punishment was to extract every nail, there were a 
couple of thousand nails, from a fence that was to be demolished. Once it was done, the situation 
was laid at rest and his guilt was alleviated. He did not really feel that much shame since he 
said that he knew he was guilty in doing what was wrong. He also said he knew that did not 
make him a bad person with lots of flaws, when him and I reflected on his actions. He felt more 
ashamed that people might think he was not an honest person.30 
 Bartky notes that “shame is called forth by the apprehension of some serious flaw in the 
self, guilt by the consciousness that one has committed a transgression.”31 Bartky's distinction 
between shame and guilt reinforces shame as Taylor's conception of global assessment of the 
self, and guilt as pertaining to the individual's actions. By “global” I mean all the aspects of the 
self. That shame, on Taylor’s view, assesses the entire self and not solely parts of the self.  
Further, Bartky claims that “shame and guilt are alike in that each involves a condemnation of 
the self by itself for some failure to measure up; it is the measure that differs.”32 The different 
measures are shortcomings versus wrongdoings for shame and guilt, respectively. However, it 
seems that shame and guilt can involve a condemnation of the self by others as well. Let us 
 
30 I have received permission via text from my younger brother to use this as an example.  
31 Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 1990), 87.  
32 Ibid. 
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stick with Sally as our example. It could be that she is out with friends and one of them says 
that people are immature if they still play with Barbies at their age. It so happens that Sally 
plays with Barbies and she highly admires the person who made the statement about Barbies. 
In this case, it seems that Sally feels shame because one of her friends condemned her, perhaps 
without their knowing, and deemed her immature. Her condemnation of herself would occur 
shortly after she feels shame from her friend's disapproval. Hence, shame and guilt can occur 
when condemnation of the self develops internally and autonomously, and it can occur when it 
is driven by externalities (Sally’s friends). This makes shame potentially highly pervasive in 
our daily lives since episodes of shame can occur both alone and in social settings.  
 Taylor emphasises that the individual must agree with the audience's view on norms and 
values in order to feel shame. Taylor’s conception of shame as a global self-assessment 
highlights the pervasive character of shame that is important for my project since I here argue 
that shame is a norm regulator for gendered subjectivities. If shame was not pervasive in the 
human experience, it would not necessarily have the same effect as a regulator of who we are 
and how we express our ways of being. Our internalisation of values and ideals would then not 
necessarily have such a strong grip on us. Further, if shame was not an emotion of self-
assessment pertaining to what we value, who we are and want to be, shame would not 
necessarily be a regulatory force for our subjectivity. However, I disagree with Taylor's claim 
that a person must agree with the shaming audience’s values and norms in order to feel shame. 
Both Bartky and Calhoun demonstrate different ways in which a person can feel shame without 
agreeing with the point of view of the audience.  
To summarise, shame is a painful awareness of oneself as falling short of an expected 
standard or ideal perpetuated by societal norms,33 and it distinguishes itself from guilt in that 
guilt occurs when an individual breaks the law to which he or she accepts the authority of.34 
Action and a character's entanglement in the make-up of a person, pose a challenge to these 
definitions to shame and guilt. Because action and character are so intertwined, it is difficult to 




33 Jennifer C. Manion, “Girls Blush, Sometimes: Gender, Moral Agency, and the Problem of Shame,” Hypatia 
18, no. 3 (2003): 21. 
34 Gabriele Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment (New York, USA: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), 85. 
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Arguments Against Agreeing with the Audience 
To support her argument against the importance of agreeing with the audience's view, Bartky 
discusses a classroom setting from her own teaching experience. In her class, women, who 
lacked a sense of inferiority to their male peers and felt strong in their sense of self, felt inferior 
and apprehensive when handing in papers. Bartky attributes this sudden sense of inferiority to 
reinforced gender-specific behaviours and expectations of competence by professors who 
expect higher competence from their male students, since this is also supported by research.35   
Additionally, Bartky theorises that self-shaming was easier to handle than the shame they might 
feel from Bartky's external criticism. The female students can then at least choose the time and 
place of their suffering.36 This example is at odds with Taylor's view because the women in 
Bartky's classroom setting did not agree with the view that they are inferior to their male 
counterparts and yet they still felt shame. One of the reasons they felt shame, might be because 
they had been exposed, as Bartky highlights, to different behaviours from their professors 
compared to male students. More poignantly, though, it could be because of an internalisation 
of the messages of inferiority that, over time, create associations between their sense of self and 
incompetence. This holds true even if they do not believe in, or are directly aware of, these 
internalised associations.  
 Internalisations of repeated messages of inferiority contribute to a person acting inferior 
even though she does not necessarily believe herself to be inferior. The messages might not be 
intended to shame someone, but the person on the other end might still feel shame because the 
messages of shame pertain to a person’s sense of self. Being told, either implicitly or explicitly, 
that one does not have the same academic qualities as one’s male peers, ignites a sense of failure 
to live up to a standard or ideal, and hence, the person feels shame. To stop feeling shame, and 
avoid future acute feelings of shame, we may strive to achieve the standard set by one's male 
peers.37 However, most likely you end up reaching for a different standard that is reinforced 
and internalised as achievable by the social subgroup you belong to. Bartky’s discussion on 
shame highlights how shame influences behaviour and sense of self despite an individual's 
disagreement with the audience’s values and standards. Her discussion is important for my 
project because it demonstrates that shame is relevant regardless of our individual views. We 
are not immune to shame as we might hold onto underlying ideas of who we ought to be, due 
 
35 Ibid., 89. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Set either presently or historically 
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to the internalisation of societal norms. Bartky's example of her female students with a strong 
sense of self, demonstrates how we are not immune. Here, shame operates on a level where we 
must dig deeper into a person's values and sense of self, in order to recognise that shame is an 
important regulator in our expression of self in society.  
 Parts of Cheshire Calhoun's points can also explain why Bartky's students felt shame, 
even though their belief in self indicates that they would not feel it. In “An Apology for Moral 
Shame” Calhoun argues that “a person could be shamed by criticism … that she thinks is plainly 
wrong … [because] in sharing a moral practice with us, others' views come to have practical 
weight in the sense that they articulate moral interpretations of our character and actions that 
any number of others within the practice might share.”38 To illustrate this, Calhoun uses the 
example of Adrian Piper's experience when she was applying to graduate school and identified 
herself as black.39 During a meet-and-greet for the graduate students, a highly acclaimed faculty 
member exclaimed that Piper is as Black as he, a White professor. Piper does not share the view 
of the professor, who is the shamer in this case, “that she is manipulative and deceitful.”40  
 However, the moral criticism from the professor has what Calhoun calls practical 
weight. “Moral criticism has practical weight when we see it as issuing from those who are to 
be taken seriously because they are co-participants with us in some shared social practice of 
morality.”41 Hence, Piper's shame does not come about because she shares the view of the 
professor, as Taylor would argue. Rather, she is forced to enter a shared moral practice based 
on the social setting she finds herself in, and she therefore feels shame because “the social 
practice generates shared understandings about … how to interpret when basic moral 
obligations, like the duty of truth-telling, have been fulfilled.”42 Here, Piper is accused in a 
public setting of not having fulfilled the moral obligation of truth-telling. Shame is therefore 
considered by Calhoun to be an emotion of the practitioner of morality and not that of the 
normatively reflective emotion of self-assessment as posed by Taylor. Piper does not agree with 
the norm of Blackness expressed by the professor, but she shares a moral practice with her 
professor who expresses a disapproving evaluation of her as Black.43  
 
38 Cheshire Calhoun, “An Apology for Moral Shame,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 12, no. 2 (2004): 
142. 
39 To read the full narrative I refer the reader to Adrian Piper, “Passing for White, Passing for Black,” 
Transitions 58 (1992): 4-32. 
40 Cheshire Calhoun, “An Apology for Moral Shame,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 12, no. 2 (2004): 
137. 
41 Ibid., 139. 
42 Ibid., 140. 
43 Heidi L. Maibom, “The Descent of Shame,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80, no. 3 (2010): 
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 Further, Calhoun would consider Piper to display moral maturity because Calhoun 
“thinks that vulnerability of feeling ashamed before those with whom one shares a moral 
practice, even when one disagrees with their moral criticisms, is often a mark of moral 
maturity.”44 Calhoun’s point on feeling shame when being disapproved of by those we share a 
moral practice with, is important in relation to my thesis. It is important because there are values 
and ideals in society that we cannot escape from interacting with. Values that are held by people 
we may or may not agree with, but who we engage with in our daily social interactions. In these 
situations, feelings of shame can occur, and shape how we continue to act socially and view 
ourselves, even where we do not expect it (like Piper). While shaming can be very visual and 
clear in certain social situations, shame can also be invisible in its action because we do not 
expect it and can be surprised by our reaction to it as demonstrated through Piper’s example. 
Shame operates in places and situations where we do not expect it to influence us. Calhoun's 
discussion on shame and Piper’s example, contribute to demonstrate shame's pervasive nature 
and regulatory force in our expression of self. 
 Dan Zahavi, however, disagrees specifically with Calhoun and thinks that the 
characterisation of shame in her example is a case of humiliation because it did not lead to an 
overall decrease of self-esteem.45 Zahavi thinks global decrease of self-esteem is a necessary 
feature of shame that comes about if the individual accepts the audience's assessment.46 
According to Zahavi's view of shame, Piper is feeling shame because she was being judged by 
someone she respected.47 I can understand Zahavi's argument that Calhoun and Piper's reason 
for Piper's shame is misplaced. However, I think Zahavi is ignoring a point Piper brings up 
herself: “For this kind of shame, you don't actually need to have done anything wrong. All you 
need to do is care about others' image of you and fail in your actions to reinforce their positive 
image of themselves. Their ridicule and accusations then function to both disown and degrade 
you from their status, to mark you not as having done wrong but as being wrong.”48 So even 
though Piper does not agree with the shamer's view, she cares about her presentation and 
 
571. 
44 Ibid., 192; emphasis in original. 
45 Zahavi speficially mentions that he disagrees with Calhoun but, as will soon become clear through Piper's 
example that Calhoun also uses, it seems he has not done proper groundwork before disagreeing with 
Calhoun. 
46 Dan Zahavi, Self & Other: Exploring Subjectivity, empathy, and Shame (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 228. 
47 Ibid., 227. 
48 Adrian Piper, “Passing for White, Passing for Black,” Transitions 58 (1992): 6. 
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legitimacy in the eyes of fellow academics. She presented herself as Black, but is revealed, 
based on the opinion of the acclaimed professor, as White.  
 Zahavi's disagreement with Calhoun is a little surprising since he claims himself that 
there exists a “kind of shame that is induced by a deflation and devaluation of our public 
appearance and social self-identity, by the exposure of a discrepancy between who we claim to 
be and how we are perceived by others.”49 Piper's experience shows that there can still be a 
decrease in self-esteem and inducement of shame without having to agree with the audience's 
opinion. Her experience poses challenges to both Taylor's and Zahavi's view on the importance 
of identifying with the audience's view. In relation to my thesis and the aforementioned 
distinction on guilt and shame by Taylor and Bartky, where guilt pertains to transgression of 
actions and shame in relation to a failure to a certain standard of being, we see that shame 
influences our self-identity in relation to ourselves and how we present ourselves to others. 
Shame does not occur because of something wrong you have done, as Piper pointed out, but 
because your being is perceived as wrong. If the focus was on the wrongdoing, emotions of 
guilt would be felt. However, that is not the case in this example, which shows the intricacies 
of guilt and shame in everyday interactions often occur simultaneously.   
 To summarise, when feeling shame an individual often agrees with the audience’s view 
and values. This agreement with the audience, however, is not compulsory to feel shame since 
shame can be evoked by someone whose opinion and values you disagree with, but who is a 
member of your social subgroup, as illustrated with the example of Piper. 
 
Social and Isolating Aspects of Shame 
Zahavi also addresses Taylor's idea of shame as an emotion of self-assessment in his book Self 
& Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame and argues that shame is isolating in a 
way where we do not let others in on our experience of it.50 He distinguishes guilt from shame 
in that shame “is about shortcomings whereas [guilt] is about wrongdoings. In guilt the focus 
is on specific actions of the self, whereas the focus of shame is on the self as such.”51 Shame is, 
according to Zahavi and like Taylor also says, an emotion of self-assessment in relation to the 
audience whose viewpoint we are in agreement with. Further, shame is “a painful awareness of 
 
49 Dan Zahavi, Self & Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 212. 
50 Ibid., 223. 
51 Ibid., footnote 6, 217. 
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personal flaws and deficiencies;”52 but also, and more importantly according to Zahavi, an 
emotion that affects our relationship to everybody. It is because of the isolating character of 
shame, that Zahavi finds it more plausible that “shame, rather than simply involving a global 
decrease of self-esteem and self-confidence, is also essentially characterised by the way it 
affects and alters our relationship to and connectedness with others in general.”53 The social 
isolation of shame is a result of, amongst others, “the conviction that others would not have 
done or been like [ourselves].”54 In lieu of Piper, her relationship to the White professor and her 
peers was altered when he implied she had not been truthful on her application. However, she 
did not necessarily have a global decrease of self-esteem or self-confidence. The essential 
aspect here, according to Zhavi's theory, was how her relationship to others was altered. A global 
decrease in self-esteem and self-confidence could also occur but does not have to in order for 
feelings of shame to occur.  
 Further, Zahavi stresses the importance of others in shame and selfhood because he 
thinks that we become our social selves by experiencing and internalising the other's 
perspectives on ourselves and our emotional response to them.55 Sometimes we feel shame 
when we are ignored or overlooked by someone. Shame is, in this view, related to a loss of 
social recognition,56 it “is essentially about our lives with others, about our identity in a group, 
and our standing within it.”57  In our social interactions, we often measure ourselves to the 
norms of how others act. We can feel exposed or overlooked by others if we fail to meet the 
standards set forth by those norms, whether we agree with them or not. In our failures we lose 
standing with our peers or with ourselves; often both. We feel like we have done something 
others would not have done and, therefore, we often feel different and more distant from others, 
but perhaps also distant from ourselves.  
 For example, Sally asks a group of her girlfriends about masturbation and the girls are 
quick to reply that they do not masturbate, that they do not have a need for it, and that they 
think it is something boys do and not girls. Sally will here most likely feel shame about her own 
masturbatory habits. Because the others expressed that they do not masturbate, no matter if they 
actually do or do not masturbate, Sally feels different than the others, and cut-off from them in 
 
52 Ibid., 210. 
53 Ibid., 223. 
54 Ibid., 218. 
55 Ibid., 238. 
56 Ibid., 224. 
57 Heidi L. Maibom, “The Descent of Shame,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80, no. 3 (2010): 
576. 
Page 22 of 76 
 
relation to masturbation and her status as a dignified girl. It is something everyone in her social 
peer group communicates is not acceptable for a girl to do or have a need for. Sally, usually 
thinking that she is an acceptable girl,58 feels shame and isolation in relation to her friends given 
her open communication about her thoughts and behaviours that deviate from theirs. She also 
feels shame in relation to herself because it has been communicated to her that she is not the 
acceptable girl that she thought she was. Hence, shame influences Sally's relationship with 
herself, as Taylor would have it, and her relationship to everybody else,59 as Zahavi adds to 
Taylor's analysis. With regards to my thesis, Zahavi highlights how shame is a participatory 
force in our subjugation in how it shapes our relation to self and others. Shame regulates our 
subjectivities to fit our own values, but also the norms of our different societies so that we can 
participate in life as useful and approved-of individuals.  
To summarise, shame influences our relation to those around us in that it socialises us 
in our motivation to act according to the same norms, but shame also isolates us in that we feel 
separated from our social subgroup since feelings of shame often include a feeling that others 
would not be the way you are. So far, most of the focus in my analysis has been on the repressive 
aspect of shame. I will now move forward to focus on some of shame's beneficial 
characteristics. 
 
Beneficial Characteristics of Shame 
One beneficial aspect of shame is its protective form given its “respect for boundaries of 
intimacy.”60 If something intimate is publicly revealed about yourself that you wish to remain 
private, you might feel shame because of the exposure. Shame is also protective in its 
preventative form to avoid having parts of ourselves exposed to “the [violence] that public 
scrutiny might cause.”61 In this respect, shame is, according to Zahavi, “a guardian of dignity 
[because] it puts us on guard against undignified behaviour that would place us (and others) in 
shaming situations.”62  Even though shame is often considered to paralyse an individual from 
action and can be associated with overwhelming feelings of helplessness,63 shame can also be 
 
58 As she should! 
59 At least those around her. 
60 Dan Zahavi, Self & Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 214. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., 215. 
63 Jennifer C. Manion, “The Moral Relevance of Shame,” American Philosophical Quarterly 39, no 1 (2002): 
78; Leonard Boonin, “Guilt, Shame and Morality,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 17 (1983): 300.  
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constructive in socialisation and individual development. When considering socialisation, 
shame is constructive because it can promote social conformity, which facilitates integration 
into a society. In terms of individual transformation and development, shame can challenge 
their understanding of themselves and force them to re-evaluate their core values and beliefs. 
Manion advocates for such a positive and transformative notion of shame in “The Moral 
Relevance of Shame.”  
 In her article, Manion highlights how experiencing shame can be a positive notion for 
the moral self since it forces the individual to intensely self-reflect on and identify the standards, 
or regulations, that he or she currently endorses.64 Shame can require an assessment of the self 
that goes beyond your specific actions. Shame requires an evaluation of your individual 
character, or what you wish to care about and who you wish to be. Manion argues that shame 
can therefore contribute to individual transformations. Even though shaming socialises and 
individualises the self through norms in relation to others, it can also transform the individual 
in relation to him- or herself.65 Because feelings of shame “are unanticipated, [they] interrupt 
our expectations of our capabilities and how we fit in the world in a particularly dramatic way: 
they suspend our confidence in ourselves.”66 For instance, our friend Sally might meet someone 
who challenges her to reflect on her core values and why she feels ashamed that she plays with 
Barbies or masturbates. Sally may actually come to realise that she needs not be ashamed. 
However, this is not an easy feat, but “working through feelings of shame might very well help 
us shape new, more positive ideals of who we can still be in the future.”67 Through Manion’s 
transformative notion of shame, we see how shame can bring forth resistance against 
subjugation caused by shame. For instance, resistance to adhere to current ideals and norms. 
However, through this transformation, new forms of ideals will spring out and shame will 
continue to operate as a norm regulator because we find other forms of subjectivity that we 
internalise as the new legitimate ways of being. As such, shame can be a point of resistance to 
current norms of gendered subjectivities, but it can still be a regulatory force for new gendered 
norms of subjectivities, that most likely will be shaped in the future.  
To summarise, shame can protect the self and motivate integration and self-growth. The 
protective quality of shame includes characteristics such as preventing us from exposing details 
 
64 Jennifer C. Manion, “The Moral Relevance of Shame,” American Philosophical Quarterly 39, no 1 (2002): 
84.  
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 83; emphasis in original. 
67 Jennifer C. Manion, “The Moral Relevance of Shame,” American Philosophical Quarterly 39, no 1 (2002); 
84.  
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about ourselves which can induce violent social scrutiny. In terms of integration, shame 
socialises us to conform to a norm which can be beneficial when trying to integrate into new 
societies. Lastly, shame has the potential for individual transformation because it can challenge 
our understanding of ourselves and force us to re-evaluate our core values and beliefs.  
 
Gendered Experiences of Shame 
I have briefly touched on gender in relation to shame, but Lehtinen takes a particularly 
interesting gendered approach to shame in her dissertation Underdog Shame: Philosophical 
Essays on Women's Internalisation of Inferiority. She argues that the experience and knowledge 
of shame is gender-specific.68 She thinks that shame involves “reflections on 'what one is and 
how one is related to others' – the core of what shame is about – must therefore also encompass 
reflections of oneself as a social individual, as part of, positioned in, and psychologically 
conditioned by, a social hierarchy.”69 Hence, Lehtinen reflects on an intersectional notion of 
shame – her basis for gender-specificity starts with a discussion in a conference in Denmark. 
There was a disagreement concerning a picture of a woman running with her baby through rows 
of people scorning her because she was accused of having a sexual and romantic relationship 
with someone from the German forces during World War II.70 The vast majority of the women 
in the audience agreed that the woman in the picture felt shame. The men in the audience, 
however, argued that we could not know if the woman felt shame and they argued she might 
feel morally superior to her perpetrators. That the shame observable on the picture was only an 
outside shame that did not resonate with her internally. 
 Based on this discussion, Lehtinen purports to distinguish between two types of 
experiences: episodic experiences, which can be of a wide variety and denotes mental events, 
processes etc.; and life experiences which are more general and enduring. Episodic experiences 
and life experiences also differ with respect to time. An episodic experience has specific cut off 
points, while this is not necessarily the case for life experiences.71 An episodic experience, such 
as knitting, may happen for 20 minutes. However, we gather life experience over years of living. 
A person may have known knitting for the last 30 years of her life, but she has not continuously 
 
68 Ullaliina Lehtinen, Underdog Shame: Philosophical Essays on Women's Internalisation of Inferiority, Röda 
Serien, no. 37 (Göteborg, Sweden: Filosofiska Meddelanden, 1998). 
69 Ibid., 59. 
70 Ibid., 100-101. 
71 Of course, an end point for life experiences would be death, but it is harder to identify the one specific 
episode that changes the experience into life experience. 
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been knitting for those 30 years.72 In relation to knowledge, Lehtinen claims that a single 
episode seldom suffices for knowledge and that the majority of what we can claim to justifiably 
know is based on life experiences. She states that “our knowledge of ... [an] episode springs not 
from the incident itself but from the … general [life] experience that we bring to the situation.”73  
 However, it seems Lehtinen neglects to extricate that our knowledge which comes from 
life experience must also come from somewhere. She is steadfast in that knowledge cannot 
come from a single episode, but I think it can come from many recurring episodes. After all, in 
light of knowledge claims stemming from life experiences, Lehtinen specifies that different 
socialisations of women and men, particularly in that of shaming, open the likeliness of gender-
specific knowledge of shame. Gender-specific knowledge can explain the disagreement 
between the women and the men in her conference audience.74 So, it could be that recurring 
episodes of shame and socialisations contribute to overall life experience.75 I do not see how 
else we can gather life experience from the events of our lives. Women, she argues, experience 
a deeper shame than men, who will experience what she calls an aristocrat shame. She 
characterises the aristocrat shame as “a revelation of a fall and a lowering of self-respect.”76 
Lehtinen describes underdog shame, or the deep shame of women, as one of Bartky's aspects 
of shame, namely, “internalisation of pervasive intimations of inferiority.”77 
 Aristocrat shame is episodic, occurring as a discreet event where the person who feels 
shame is often free to express pride about how the person matures through the process of 
remorse or reflection. As such, shame is more easily alleviated in aristocrat shame compared to 
underdog shame.78 This is because individuals who feel aristocrat shame are most likely more 
privileged in the social hierarchy. Through their apologies for their behaviours, those who feel 
aristocrat shame demonstrate a level of mastery that reinstates their belonging to a privileged 
position, sustaining the social hierarchy and resolving their shame.79 This so-called easiness 
does not take away from the actual pain and difficulty a person who experiences aristocrat 
 
72 Ullaliina Lehtinen, “How Does One Know What Shame is? Epistemology, Emotions, and Forms of Life in 
Juxtaposition,” Hypatia 13, no. 1 (1998): 65. 
73 Ibid., 117. 
74 Here, gender-specific does not mean that the experience of shame is limited only to women, but that women's 
experiences of shame have different characteristics when seen in relation to men's experience of shame in the 
man-woman power dynamic. 
75 I would also add that shame is part of the socialisations of individuals (as is guilt, education, etc).  
76 Ibid., 47. 
77 Ibid.; Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New 
York, NY: Routledge, 1990), 7. 
78 Ullaliina Lehtinen, Underdog Shame: Philosophical Essays on Women's Internalisation of Inferiority, Röda 
Serien, no. 37 (Göteborg, Sweden: Filosofiska Meddelanden, 1998), 46. 
79 Ibid., 46-47. 
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shame might indeed feel. Rather, it is simply in comparison to underdog shame. The shame in 
aristocrat shame “is perceived as a fall, a lowering, and as a sudden, painful and unexpected 
change in the state of things.”80 These latter characterisations are in line with the basic 
characterisations of shame discussed in the first section of this chapter, while the paralysing 
aspect and feelings of inferiority connected with shame, discussed in the first section, relate 
more to Lehtinen's characterisation of underdog shame.  
 Underdog shame is a life experience that is more enduring and general, and usually 
happens to those in an underprivileged position in society. A person who feels underdog shame 
is reduced to an object and the shame carries with it “an aspect of internalisation of pervasive 
intimations of inferiority.”81 Further, “the underdog shame brings no new, altered understanding 
of self, but rather forms a pervasive affective attunement to the social environment.”82 As such, 
“underdog shame forms a confirmation, affirmation, or rediscovery of what [the person] has 
already known or on numerous previous occasions has learnt to be true: that she is a person of 
lesser worth.”83 Lehtinen's description of underdog shame's pervasive character makes it 
difficult to see how a person can move beyond the attunements of the social environment or 
internalised social norms. Manion's argument on shame's transformative power challenges 
Lehtinen's notion that underdog shame does not provide a new and altered understanding of the 
self. If a person feels underdog shame, a transformation might be harder to achieve compared 
to aristocrat shame, but there is still a potential there in light of Manion's point that shame forces 
a person to intensely self-reflect. The reflection might lead to a transformation of the self or 
perhaps an attunement to the social environment. If experiencing underdog shame, I believe 
that the process of undergoing a positive self-transformation is still possible, in light of 
Manion's arguments, but is much harder because of underdog shame’s pervasive character.  
 Hierarchal positions of women and men in society make women more prone to feelings 
of underdog shame because there have been so many – almost a continuous flow – of instances 
that informed them that they are of lesser worth. This has shaped their life experiences. The 
enduring aspect of underdog shame is one of the characteristics which makes it difficult for 
women to experience the transformative notion of shame, as proposed by Manion. The 
understanding of themselves as a person of lesser worth, a person who is wrong in their being, 
also inhibits a potential transformation through shame. These characteristics are so pervasive 
 
80 Ibid., 49. 
81 Ibid., 47. 
82 Ibid., 48. 
83 Ibid., 49-50. 
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that the belief of oneself as inferior comes automatically and makes it difficult to change that 
pattern of thought and belief. It does not mean it is impossible for those experiencing underdog 
shame to question their values and the societal norms. Instead, it indicates that a more extensive 
effort from the self and others might be necessary for an individual to intensely self-reflect as a 
result of shame and transform into a person with a new sense of self.  
 Further, Lehtinen talks about aristocrat and underdog shame in relation to man and 
woman. I, however, would like to take an added intersectional approach and highlight that 
aristocrat and underdog shame are not bound to man and woman. Depending on the different 
hierarchical structures in different societies, a man might feel underdog shame in relation to a 
woman. Especially in the White West, it is not unimaginable to see how a Black man might feel 
underdog shame in relation to a White woman who will feel aristocrat shame, or a Black woman 
in relation to a White woman. Where we are socialised differently with regards to gender, we 
are also, unfortunately, socialised differently with regards to skin colour and messages of who 
is worth more; with the prevailing message being that White is the ideal standard.  
We can find similar patterns in terms of sexuality. In episodes of shame, the heterosexual 
is more likely to feel aristocrat shame because we are socialised into norms of heterosexuality. 
The heterosexual is less likely to be shamed for his or her sexuality compared to the, for 
instance, homosexual who will feel underdog shame. Further, race, gender and sexuality will 
intersect and create different relations of aristocrat shame where a Black homosexual man is 
more likely to feel underdog shame compared to a White homosexual man because 
homosexuality is much more stigmatised in Black communities.84 Here, I am not even 
accounting for how different religious views might play into this dynamic. Men might also feel 
more deep shame compared to women when it comes to expressing emotions and feeling 
vulnerable. In the case of rape, a highly stigmatised topic, both women and men can feel 
underdog shame. It would be difficult to categorise in terms of gender if women or men feel 
underdog shame versus aristocrat shame if they have been raped. Who would feel underdog 
shame in the relation between the raped woman and the raped man? Would a raped woman feel 
underdog shame and a raped man feel aristocrat shame compared to the raped woman? Or vice 
versa? Rape is a power dynamic and I honestly believe that it should not be categorised if only 
a raped man or a raped woman fits the underdog shame category. They both fit this category. 
The case of rape can show that both women and men can be categorised together. 
 
84 This is based on generalities. 
Page 28 of 76 
 
 Bartky also argues that women have different experiences of shame than men because 
women are situated differently in society compared to men. Women are thought to be more 
prone to feelings of shame compared to men because of how they are situated differently in 
society.85 For instance, body ideals are different for women and men, and vary across cultures. 
The media constantly bombards us with images of what body types are of value that people 
should strive to have. For women in the West these bodies are usually White, thin, with a thigh 
gap, and due to recent trends, with toned – but not too bulky – muscles. For men in the West, it 
is usually a White body that is either a V-shaped body inspired by the value we place on 
athleticism and sports and the eroticism of a pornographic body, called spornosexual, or a 
combination of the hipster and lumberjack; but overall, the bodies are muscular, fit, and 
groomed. Further, women are highly objectified in society, constantly receiving messages of 
their dehumanisation. While men are less frequently objectified, this does not mean that men 
are never objectified. There has been an increasing trend with the objectification of men and, 
consequently, body dissatisfaction and eating disorders.86 However, objectification of men is 
not as pervasive on all societal levels as it is for women; a recent study found that the brain 
registers men as whole but women as parts, most likely a result of our internalisation of the 
societal objectification of women.87  
 Because of these gendered differences in body ideals and differences in societal relations 
for men and women, where men usually stand in a more privileged position than women, 
feelings of shame will be different when confronted with not having or failing to achieve the 
societal body ideal. For example, if a man shames a woman for her body type, both the man 
and the woman can feel shame. The man might feel shame because someone tells him that it is 
wrong to shame people for their body type and engage him in a discussion about the 
objectification of women and unrealistic body ideals. This man recognises his mistake and feels 
ashamed, but also remorse as he wishes he could take it back. To alleviate his shame, he 
apologises to the woman and explains how his act of shaming her was ignorant. Afterwards he 
might feel proud of his transformation; how he was open to listen to perspectives on 
objectification of women, how he owned up to his mistake and apologised, and that he feels 
himself to be a person with better values going forward in the future (very characteristic of 
 
85 Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 1990), 83, 85. 
86 Antonios Dakanalis et al., “Male body dissatisfaction and eating disorder symptomatology: moderating 
variables among men,” Journal of Health Psychology 20, no. 1 (2013): 80. 
87  Stephanie Pappas, “Brain Sees Men as Whole, Women as Parts,” Live Science, Jul. 24, 2012, 
http://www.livescience.com/21806-brain-male-female-objectification.html  
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Lehtinen's aristocrat shame).  
 The woman's shame, however, is characteristic of Lehtinen's underdog shame. She has 
already internalised recurring messages telling her that she is not good enough, that she does 
not uphold the standards of what a woman should look like, and that she is not a whole person. 
The shame she feels from the man's confrontation does not inform her of something new, but 
affirms what she has already known on numerous occasions: That she is someone of lesser 
worth. Being the underdog, she does not stand in the same privileged position as the man where 
she can go and apologise or have someone tell her on one occasion that she is wrong, for her 
shame to be alleviated. Because this shame is a result of recurring shamed episodes, more work 
is required to alleviate her shame, if at all possible. However, in lieu of Manion's transformative 
aspect of shame, the woman who experiences underdog shame will be forced to evaluate what 
norms and ideals she has internalised and what value she places on these norms and ideals. 
Perhaps she thinks that she is wrong, and the norms and ideals are right since innumerable social 
interactions – media messages, body shaming among friends, etc. – constantly tell her that she 
is wrong. However, she can also recognise that the ideals are constructed and start a process of 
self-transformation in which she no longer feels that same type of shame again, or at least the 
shame will be short-lived and quickly alleviated in similar subsequent situations. Even if she 
undergoes such a transformation, she is not immune to feel ashamed again because 
objectification is so pervasive and persistent. However, the next time she feels such shame she 
will most likely, and hopefully, not be stuck in it for as long. 
 To summarise, because of women's and men's different positions in society, they have 
different experiences from life. These factors influence a gender-specific experience of shame 
where men are more likely to experience aristocrat shame, an episodic event that reveals a 
descent in his moral and social standing. Women are more likely to experience underdog shame, 
a more enduring life experience that is characterised by internalisations of inferiority. 
Lehtinen’s account of gendered experiences of shame will also influence my analysis of 
activity/masculinity and passivity/femininity because of how we associate masculinity with 
men and femininity with women. I will also account further for Manion's transformative 
character of shame, where both women and men can recognise the source of their shame and 
take action to alleviate their respective types of shame, to move forward, and to try and become 
a better person for their future selves. Further, in its regulation and shaping of individuals, 
shame mirrors aspects of Foucault's notion of a productive and disciplinary power, but I will 
elaborate on this in the next chapter.  
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Summary 
Shame distinguishes itself from guilt in that guilt is a legal concept in relation to when an 
individual breaks the law to which he or she accepts the authority of,88 while shame is a painful 
awareness of the self as less than the expected standards or ideals.89 Because of differences in 
life experiences, we can find a gender-specificity to shame. According to Lehtinen, women 
experience a deep shame, called underdog shame,90 that is characterised by an “internalisation 
of pervasive intimations of inferiority,”91 and men experience an aristocrat shame that is 
characterised as “a revelation of a fall and a lowering of self-respect.”92 However, power 
dynamics can influence who feels aristocrat shame and who feels underdog shame, depending 
on the social situation. Further, shame has the potential for individual transformation because 
shame forces you to reflect on yourself, your values and your held beliefs. Such a 
transformation can come easier to someone who experiences aristocrat shame than someone 
who experiences underdog shame. This is because the underdog shame is more enduring 
compared to the episodic trait of an aristocrat shame.   
 Here, I have provided a distinction between shame and guilt, extrapolated more on the 
social, isolating and positive characteristics of shame, and provided a gendered account of 
shame. In the following chapter I will go into detail about Foucault's notion of power, how it 










88 Gabriele Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment (New York, USA: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), 85. 
89 Jennifer C. Manion, “Girls Blush, Sometimes: Gender, Moral Agency, and the Problem of Shame,” Hypatia 
18, no. 3 (2003): 21. 
90 Ullaliina Lehtinen, Underdog Shame: Philosophical Essays on Women's Internalisation of Inferiority, Röda 
Serien, no. 37 (Göteborg, Sweden: Filosofiska Meddelanden, 1998). 
91 Ibid., 47; Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New 
York, NY: Routledge, 1990), 7. 
92 Ullaliina Lehtinen, Underdog Shame: Philosophical Essays on Women's Internalisation of Inferiority, Röda 
Serien, no. 37 (Göteborg, Sweden: Filosofiska Meddelanden, 1998), 47. 
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Foucault, Shame, and Feminine Corporealities 
My thesis focuses on shame as a norm regulator for gendered subjectivities. I argue that we can 
understand shame as an aspect of a Foucauldian notion of power in relation to its disciplinary 
and productive characteristics. Power, specifically when applying Foucault’s understanding of 
power, is an important factor in the production of truth in the different societal institutions. 
Societal institutions like schools, prisons, work factories, and hospitals. Foucault’s genealogical 
method investigates and critiques how truth-knowledges are influenced by different power 
relations historically; how truths are not a priori truths. In this chapter I will first consider 
Foucault’s notion of power and explain it in relation to discipline and the production of 
knowledge and subjectivity. Then, I will elaborate on Foucault’s account of power and sexuality 
in relation to subjectivity. Throughout my discussion on discipline, production of knowledge, 
and sexuality, I will highlight shame as an aspect of Foucauldian power and discuss how shame 
relates to a production of subjectivities. Lastly, I will address how feminine bodies have 
different subjugation through the power of disciplinary shame. 
 
Power and Subjectivity 
Foucault brings a new perspective on power in his theories. He specifically does so in Discipline 
and Punish: The Birth of the Prison93 and The Will to Knowledge. History of Sexuality: Volume 
One,94 where he connects power to notions of disciplinary production of bodies, knowledge, 
sex, and subjectivities. Through his genealogical method of analysis, Foucault analyses the 
history of power and brings a new perspective that focuses on power as discourse and as being 
omnipresent. In this chapter, I will elaborate on Foucault’s notion of power and its subjugation 
of bodies by specifically looking at discipline, knowledge, sex, and subjectivities. I focus on 
these sections of Foucault’s work because of how they relate to my understanding of shame as 
an aspect of a Foucauldian notion of power. Shame’s normative and subjugating force are 
particularly relevant here. 
Power, in Foucault’s analysis, is “not a thing, but a relation... [;] not simply repressive 
but it is productive... [;] not simply a property of the state... [,] localised in government... [, but 
it] is exercised throughout the social body... [;] power operates at the most micro levels of social 
 
93 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin 
Group, 1991). 
94 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge. History of Sexuality: Volume One, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, 
CA: Penguin Group, 1998). 
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interactions. Power is omnipresent at every level of the social body.”95 In his claim that power 
is a relation and not a thing, Foucault further claims that power is not something that can be 
possessed but something that is exercised in a network of relations.96 By exercising power, 
power is produced. The exercise of power also produces knowledge. However, knowledge also 
implies power in the following sense: There is “no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute 
at the same time power relations.”97  
In my understanding, this does not necessarily mean that power and knowledge are the 
same things, but that power and knowledge are intertwined in their relation. Knowledge and 
power produce each other, and they verify each other. In exercising power relations, different 
kinds of knowledges are produced and communicates to the individual how we are to behave 
and live in society. The knowledge we gather of how we behave and live in a society, is taken 
as justification for furthering our exercise of power in the same manner as we have previously 
exercised it.98 Even though power communicates knowledge of how we are to behave and live 
in society, it does not mean that power is coercive. It does not mean that power have be 
understood as something external, like a judicial law, which imposes on us how we are to 
behave.99 Rather, power is discursive in that there are ways of speaking which allow for certain 
statements to be expressed.100 The statements, ways of speaking, that are possible to be 
expressed, influence what knowledge claims can be made and how we relate to “truths.” For 
instance, when a health product is advertised as scientifically proven in the science crazed 
societies of present day, many people trust that the product is legitimate and the usage of it will 
have the desired effect. We believe that there is a truth to the product. The language of science 
influences a production of truth and the regimes we engage in for our health. Scientific 
discourse is one of the ways in which “truths” and knowledge are produced. These are not a 
priori truths, but truths that are subject to change along with the change in the mechanisms we 
use “to distinguish true and false statements.”101 Over the years, we can see changes in the 
 
95 Claire O’Farrell, “Key Concepts,” Michel-Foucault.com, 2007, last modified October 30, 2010, 
http://www.michel-foucault.com/concepts/ .   
96 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin 
Group, 1991), 26. 
97 Ibid., 27. 
98 Claire O’Farrell, “Key Concepts,” Michel-Foucault.com, 2007, last modified October 30, 2010, 
http://www.michel-foucault.com/concepts/ .   
99 “Foucault: Power is Everywhere,” Powercube, accessed April 12, 2017, https://www.powercube.net/other-
forms-of-power/foucault-power-is-everywhere/ . 
100 Claire O’Farrell, “Key Concepts,” Michel-Foucault.com, 2007, last modified October 30, 2010, 
http://www.michel-foucault.com/concepts/ .   
101 Michel Foucault and Paul Rainbow, The Foucault Reader (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1984), 73. 
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patterns of “truths” in correlation to changes in the historical mechanisms that measure the 
criteria for what qualifies as scientifically proven.  
Shame is also part of the production of “truths.” What has been shameful has also 
changed over the years. This shows that shame is also genealogical, even though it seems we 
can find traces of some of the same elements throughout history. As Foucault points out in The 
Use of Pleasure. History of Sexuality: Volume Two,102 during times of the Ancient Greeks “the 
wife, as mistress of the house, is a key figure in the management of the oikos and she is essential 
for its good government.”103 “Oikos” means “Economy” and relates to management of the 
house.104 Even though this is not as strongly present today in many Western communities, we 
still find traces of it and a woman is often shamed, to varying degrees, if she is not a good 
housewife. This can be found in more traditional religious communities where gender roles are 
more distinctly separated. Foucault does not mention shame in relation to the wife and the 
management of the household. However, considering the heavy focus of shame as a moral 
regulator in Ancient Greek societies, I do not think it is a controversial claim to say that a wife 
in Ancient Greece would bring shame upon herself and lower her status as a woman if she did 
not manage the oikos well. She might also bring shame on her husband because her status was 
tied directly to him. People from the same social practice might have thought that the husband 
did not manage his wife and house well, since the wife did not uphold the management of her 
tasks within the household.  
Further, shame can also be understood beyond a power that we possess. For instance, 
shame can be understood as a power in its exercise and its production of knowledge, and its 
relationality. I will attempt to show how we can understand shame in these three ways. Firstly, 
to address how we can understand shame as an exercise rather than solely a power we possess, 
we can think of shame in relation to societal ideals. When you shame a person, you do not 
necessarily possess the power of shame. Rather, you can exercise shaming, or power, in relation 
to societal ideals and values that you do not think the person is upholding. In this sense, you are 
not a person who owns societal ideals and values, but you communicate and repeat their 
standards through shame. In your communication, you are exercising shame, or shaming. 
 
102 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure. History of Sexuality: Volume Two, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, CA: 
Penguin Group, 1992). 
103 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure. History of Sexuality: Volume Two, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, CA: 
Penguin Group, 1992), 154. Emphasis in original.  
104 I advise the reader to read the following article for a brief, but further elaboration: Samie Al-Achrafi, “Oikos: 
The Origin of the Economic Thought,” The Huffington Post, November 11, 2015, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/samie-alachrafi/oikos-the-origins-of-econ_b_8520644.html 
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Exercising shaming can be done between people but also within a person. When social norms 
are internalised, a person might exercise shame upon themselves if he or she is about to do 
something that deviates from social norms.  
Secondly, we can understand shame as a power in its production of knowledge through 
the exercise of shame. To exemplify the exercise of shame, and better understand shame in its 
production of knowledge, we can go back to the example of Sally in “Shame, Guilt, and 
Gendered Experiences” who was shamed by her friends in relation to masturbation and her 
status as a girl. We remember that her friends’ reactions were an act of shaming which caused 
Sally to feel shame. Sally’s friends say, in reply to Sally’s question about masturbation, that 
they do not masturbate, that they do not have a need for it, and that they think it is something 
boys do and not girls. Here, they are not open to discuss the topic and they are communicating 
that such action is not appropriate for a girl, that being active in one’s sexuality is not a girl-like 
quality. In their shaming, they are (re)producing some characteristics of what it means to be a 
girl. Considering this, shame can, like power, be a production of knowledge. In the example of 
Sally and her friends, the power of shame can produce knowledge about what a girl is and is 
not, what she can and cannot do. By exercising shame in communicating knowledge of what it 
means to be a girl, shame also plays a role in the production of knowledge and the production 
of subjectivity. 
Thirdly, to understand shame in its relationality it can be helpful to think of where power 
and shame comes from. According to Foucault’s description, power is omnipresent in the sense 
that it comes from everywhere; “because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every 
point, or rather in every relation from one point to another.”105 This means that power does not 
come from only one location, e.g. from the sovereign who represses its subjects where the force 
relation becomes top-down. Power comes from every location and has many force relations. 
Sovereign power is not power itself; it is merely a modality of power, or a way, a mode, in 
which it can be exercised.  
Shame has the potentiality to come from everywhere and not just one location, even 
though it is not necessarily omnipresent like power. I say this because shame can be felt from 
different sources for different individuals. If we add that Sally is White, she will most likely not 
have her skin colour be a source of shame the way a Black person feels. Like Piper did, when 
confronted with the colour of her skin in a mainly White community. Sources of shame can 
 
105 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge. History of Sexuality: Volume One, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, 
CA: Penguin Group, 1998), 93. 
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also include media messages in a community that is mostly inhabited by people whose skin 
colour is different shades of brown/black. Most media showcase White as beautiful and create 
a narrow ideal of beauty. Shame does not have to stem from a person’s skin colour, but because 
of the different relations of the social hierarchy, skin colour can, unjustly, be a source of 
shame.106 Further, shame can come from different locations in the forms of your peers, your 
family, your doctor, your boss, etc. The different groups/locations might shame you if you do 
not conform to the standards and values that dominate the social group you participate in. Based 
on the shaming situation, your behaviour might be modified based on your avoidance of being 
shamed and feeling shame even when the presence of the shamer is only in your head.  
Another modality of power is discipline, which is one of the modes of power Foucault 
analyses in depth. It is in the analysis of disciplinary power, we see that power is not only the 
negative and repressive form of the sovereign state which we usually associated with power. 
Disciplinary power “regulates the behaviour of individuals in the social body;”107 it works “to 
forge a ‘docile body that may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved;’”108 and its 
mechanism and effects are clearly seen in institutions such as the prison, schools, and hospitals.  
In many prison systems, which Foucault also highlights, we see strong traces of Jeremy 
Bentham’s model of panopticon at play.109 Bentham’s panopticon is structured as the following:  
 
The panopticon consists of a large courtyard, with a tower in the centre, surrounded by a 
series of buildings divided into levels and cells. In each cell there are two windows: one 
brings in light and the other faces the tower, where large observatory windows allow for 
the surveillance of the cells. The cells become small theatres, in which each actor is alone, 
perfectly individualized and constantly visible. The inmate is not simply visible to the 
supervisor; he is visible to the supervisor alone-cut off from any contact. This new power 
is continuous and anonymous. Anyone could operate the architectural mechanisms as 
 
106 I say that it is unjust because we are not responsible for the pigments in our skin, and I justify this statement 
with my belief that the burden of proof lies on the racist. 
107 Claire O’Farrell, “Key Concepts,” Michel-Foucault.com, 2007, last modified October 30, 2010, 
http://www.michel-foucault.com/concepts/ .   
108 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin 
Group, 1991), 136; Michel Foucault and Paul Rainbow, The Foucault Reader (New York, NY: Pantheon 
Books, 1984), 17. 
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long as he was in the correct position, and anyone could be subjected to it. The surveillant 
could as easily be observing a criminal [or] schoolboy. … The architectural perfection is 
such that even if there is no guardian present, the power apparatus still operates 
effectively. The inmate cannot see whether or not the guardian is in the tower, so he must 
behave as if surveillance were perpetual and total. If the prisoner is never sure when he is 
being observed, he becomes his own guardian.110 
 
In addition to this style of continuous collectively individual surveillance which Bentham 
describes, there are elements of time and registration which also nurtures norms of bodily 
behaviour. The prisoners have certain hours of the day that they do manual labour, specific 
hours when they eat. Everything they do, including visits to the health care physician and 
visitors who come to see them (no matter the social standing of the visitor, whether it be a 
lawyer or a child), is registered and included in the prisoners’ individual files. The panopticon 
“serves to reform prisoners, … to put beggars to work … [, and] it is a type of location of bodies 
in space, of distribution of individuals in relation to one another, of hierarchical 
organization.”111 Its rigorous pattern of behavioural regulation is translated into the schools and 
medical care system: “Whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity of individuals on whom a 
task or a particular form of behaviour must be imposed, the panoptic schema must be used.”112 
As a child in the school system, the ringing of the bell tells us when to sit and when we can 
play. The teacher supervises what we learn and makes sure that we uphold a certain standard 
of education based on certain methods of examinations. As a patient, the doctor tells us if there 
is something seriously wrong with our body or, for instance, if we are just having a passing 
ache. All our medical examinations are kept on record. Our histories of measurements and 
examinations tell us who we are as individuals. We are subjectivised, but we also become 
objects of knowledge. Information of what the normal body and standard of what students of 
excellence should be like, are extracted from the multiplicity of all these examinations. Through 
the exercise of power relations we are disciplined, by ourselves, our peers, by the institutions, 
and the knowledge discourse, into certain forms of behaviour. These “systems of surveillance 
and assessment no longer require force or violence, as people learn to discipline themselves and 
behave in expected ways,”113 and not deviate from the norm. 
 
110 Michel Foucault and Paul Rainbow, The Foucault Reader (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1984), 19. 
111 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin 
Group, 1991), 205. 
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113 “Foucault: Power is Everywhere,” Powercube, accessed February 20, 2017, 
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Shame echoes Foucauldian power and its disciplinary modality in, amongst others, how 
we shame each other and how, through internalisation, we shame ourselves. The ‘we’ here 
refers to individuals as much as groups and institutions. Shame is a form of disciplinary power 
in the sense that it subjugates bodies into normative subjectivity. Remembering from the 
previous chapter “Shame, Guilt, and Gendered Experiences,” section “Shame and Guilt,” 
shame involves painful feelings related to a “sudden awareness of the self as [being] less good 
than hoped for and expected, precipitated by the identification of others (imaginary or real), or 
simply by the ashamed self, of a seemingly significant character shortcoming.”114 We also 
remember that, despite its suffering, a person is also informed of how to act through shamed 
subjugation where only certain ideals of expressing subjectivity are accepted as norm. Where 
the panopticon serves to produce and discipline beggars and prisoners in specific ways, shame 
is one of the forces that plays a role in reforming, and keeping in place, all individuals at 
different hierarchical positions in society. To subjugate individuals into, amongst others, 
gendered subjectivities. In the panopticon the surveillant cannot be seen by the prisoner. In 
shame, however, the shamed individual can have both a physically seen shamer and imaginary 
shamer. Experiencing the shame of being called abnormal (directly or indirectly, in the physical 
presence of a shamer) and seeing oneself through the eyes of the shamer, a person starts self-
surveilling and self-disciplining. The presence of an actual surveillant, or shamer, is no longer 
necessary as the shamed person learns to behave in the expected, standardised, and “normal”, 
ways.  
Further, our feelings of shame and actions of shaming each other is closely linked with 
the knowledge production of the disciplinary practices. The gathering of information and the 
regulations within the different institutions, contribute to provide the ideals and values we 
supposedly should strive to uphold. Such knowledge gives us incentive to shame each other, or 
feel shame, if we see someone, or if we are, deviating from the constructed norms we believe 
are good for our society. Norms which contribute to maintaining a certain status quo. If we 
shame someone else, we can often be perceived as individuals who embody the norms and be 
valued by society and rise, or at least be respected, in the social hierarchy. One reason for why 
we might be perceived as such an embodiment is because we portray ourselves as an authority 
when we shame someone else.115 However, in shaming someone else, we can also run the risk 
 
114 Jennifer C. Manion, “Girls Blush, Sometimes: Gender, Moral Agency, and the Problem of Shame,” Hypatia 
18, no. 3 (2003): 21. 
115 Even though we portray ourselves as an authority, perhaps knowingly or not, that does not mean that we in 
fact are an authority on the topic.  
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of being shamed. Sometimes the shamer is also shamed for his or her shaming. Our false 
portrayal of authority might be called out. A bystander might ask who we are to make others 
feel down about themselves, point out how the standards are harmful, or point out ways in 
which we ourselves do not uphold the standards we proclaim others should uphold. When the 
shamer is shamed, the initial shamed individual might start questioning their internalised beliefs 
and start a path of transformation, as briefly described in the previous chapter in the section 
“Beneficial Characteristics of Shame.”116 
To summarise, I have here tried to show that power is not something that can only be 
possessed, it is something that can be exercised. Knowledge is produced in shame’s exercise. 
The knowledge produced through shame can function to inform the individual of how to behave 
within the social body. One modality, or type, of power is disciplinary power which regulates 
and subjugates individuals to fit into norms through surveillance, examinations, and recordings. 
The stored and gathered information in the recordings from the surveillance of our bodies, tell 
us who we are as individuals and as groups of individuals. Collectively, the recordings produce 
a construction of a standardised body. As with power, so with shame. Shaming informs the 
individual of how to behave and disciplines individuals to fit norms. Shaming informs through 
means of surveillance by the other and contribute to self-regulating our ways of being to fit the 
standardised body. The other here is both imagined and real. Foucault’s work focuses mainly 
on one type of body’s individuation and objectification, so his work hugely neglects what 
different reality is produced for the female body and sex. I will explore this further in my last 
section of this chapter, but now I will move on to a discussion on power and sex. 
 
Sexuality 
Power can also produce subjectivity and objectify through sex. In, amongst others, his book 
The Will to Knowledge. History of Sexuality: Volume One, we find that Foucault explores how 
power is a function of the knowledge of sex. He aims to “define the regime of power-
knowledge-pleasure that sustains the discourse on human sexuality in our part of the world.”117 
Foucault talks about how the development of different knowledges historically has created 
certain understandings of different concepts and ideas labelled as truths. He starts off dealing 
with the Repressive Hypothesis which says that since the 17th century, and into the 20th century, 
 
116 Shame’s transformative power will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.  
117 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge. History of Sexuality: Volume One, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, 
CA: Penguin Group, 1998), 11. Emphasis in original. 
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sex was silenced, and it became a topic secluded to procreation that was only appropriate in the 
home. Sex was seen as a sin and so many believed that is should be repressed; “Sexuality was 
carefully confined; the [Victorian bourgeoisie moved it] into the home. The conjugal family 
took custody of it and absorbed it into the serious function of reproduction. On the subject of 
sex, silence became the rule.”118 Sex was not considered appropriate as a topic of discussion, 
but Foucault challenges the idea of sexuality being silenced by highlighting how there was a 
burst of investigations relating to sex. Scientia Sexualis, or the science of sexuality, included 
work done by scholars, theoreticians, and doctors which focused on topics surrounding sex, but 
which always, in some sense, hid that their work was in fact about sex. It is “a science made up 
of evasions since, given its inability or refusal to speak of sex itself, it concerns itself primarily 
with aberrations, perversions, exceptional oddities, pathological abatements, and morbid 
aggravations.”119 When investigating and exploring that which they considered abnormal, it 
seems they must have had an idea of what was considered normal. Further, by stating what 
ways of being are amongst the abnormalities, they were also, indirectly, pointing towards what 
was considered normal.  
Scientia Sexualis also concerned that of confession in the sense that the gathering of 
information concerning the perversions and pathologies, etc., required that people confessed 
their sexual preferences, emotions, and thoughts. In their confessions, hidden truths about sex 
were not uncovered, but instead “they [actually] produced sexuality as a new category of 
knowledge, a historically specific field[,]”120 and contributed to producing our subjectivities. 
These confessions, the study of the aberrations etc., and their participation in the new 
knowledge production brought forth a so-called “truth” of sex. However, as mentioned earlier, 
Foucault did not consider these confessions as some a priori truth. Rather, the “truths” people 
confessed to were effects of the power regime in which they lived in:  
[B]ehaviours and choices that today we would understand as ‘sexual’ mean different 
things at different periods and in different locations. ‘Sexuality’, as we think of it today, 
is an invention of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, produced by specific 
techniques for eliciting confession about individual desires and classifying and 
interpreting what was disclosed.121  
 
 
118 Ibid., 3. 
119 Ibid., 53. 
120 Lisa Downing, The Cambridge Introduction to Michel Foucault (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 89. Emphasis in original.  
121 Ibid., 86. 
Page 40 of 76 
 
Sexuality has historical, geographical, religious, cultural, political, etc. specificities and has 
different meanings accordingly. For instance, two grown men holding hands in India is usually 
seen as a sign of friendship, but in Norway it usually indicates a romantic relation. Even though 
confession is mostly associated with Catholicism, and for some, psychiatry and psychology, 
confession was also a practice in the medical and judicial field. The practices of confession 
evolved into knowledge discourse of “pedagogy, relationships between adults and children, 
family relations, medicine, and psychiatry [that called] for therapeutic or normalising 
interventions.”122 Our confessions functioned in some ways as “truth” bearers of what is “right” 
and “wrong,” and the constructed ideals and standards as brought forward by our confessions, 
by power and sex-knowledge, regulate our behaviour through individuation and objectification. 
We, the individuals, also regulate behaviour and subjectivate through our internalisation of 
these constructed ideals as accepted norms. When we shame someone, we are, in one way, also 
communicating different “truths.” In the same ways that Scientia Sexualis’ investigations of 
what was deemed abnormal also produced a knowledge of what was considered normal, shame 
also communicates what is considered normal through shaming that which is outside the norm 
or standard. A person shames someone, and that someone very often feels shame. The shamer 
often shames others because they see those others as less than or different than that which is 
expected according to standards and norms. The others are seen deviating from the ideals set 
forth by the historically created “truths.”123 In their shaming, in the communication that a person 
is someone less than expected and outside of the norm, they are also producing a knowledge of 
what is considered normal.  
Shame also has an aspect of the power of confessions to it. Its presence can be found, 
amongst others, in the church, in psychiatry, and within peer relations. Shame renders you 
silent, and one method of alleviating shame is through confession and receiving forgiveness or 
understanding from the other party; such a pattern is typical between the catholic and the pastor, 
the patient and the psychiatrist, and two close friends.124 Some of the other methods of 
alleviating shame, include changing your way of being to fit the norms of society and 
recognising that the ideals of subjectivity are constructed and that you do not have to be 
ashamed of yourself. One might believe that this would mean that if we confess everything, 
 
122 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge. History of Sexuality: Volume One, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, 
CA: Penguin Group, 1998), 68. 
123 There can be many different additional reasons why a shamer is shaming someone. Often it can be insecurity 
in self and by shaming others they divert the attention away from their own shortcomings and shift the focus 
over to others’ believed shortcomings.  
124 In Catholicism there is also a notion of Catholic guilt. I will not go into a discussion on that here since I have 
already laid grounds for distinguishing shame and guilt in my previous chapter.  
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then there will no longer be any shame. By everything, I mean that which we might feel 
ashamed about. If we consider the enduring aspect of underdog shame as discussed the chapter 
“Shame, Guilt, and Gendered Subjectivities,” section “Gendered Experiences of Shame,” 
confession and forgiveness does not guarantee that your shame is alleviated.  It could be that 
your shame is alleviated when you are around the person you confessed to and who still approve 
of you. However, when you are around others or are alone and think about a peer-group that 
does not approve and support of how you are, your shame painstakingly makes its presence 
known.  
For instance, because there has been an increase in acceptance and respect of people 
with a different sexuality than the heterosexual norm, which for many has been a good 
experience, there has also been a spread of a glorification of the coming-out process for many 
homosexuals. The stories about those who do not benefit from coming out do not receive much 
attention. Many people who have come out as homosexuals still often feel a shame in relation 
to how their sexual orientation is now a focus of how others primarily see them. That this way 
of being is for many considered a wrong or a specific way of being, which often feels 
constricting for many homosexuals.125 Confessing does not guarantee a relieve of shame. 
Further, the case of the homosexual also shows that underdog shame is not situated strictly in 
the woman. The location of underdog shame varies depending on the domination relations. A 
homosexual who feels shame about his sexuality, will most likely feel underdog shame because 
of the strong presence of a heteronormative society. In this relation, the heterosexual will be in 
the position of feeling aristocrat shame. Like Foucault says:  
 
[T]he manifold relationships of force that take shape and come into play in the machinery 
of production, in families, limited groups, and institutions, are the basis for wide-ranging 
effects of cleavage that run through the social body as a whole. These then form a general 
line of force that traverses the local opposition and links them together; to be sure, they 
also bring about redistributions, and convergences of the force relations. Major 
dominations are the hegemonic effects that are sustained by all these confrontations.126 
 
The force relations that come into play in the machinery of production have many effects, 
 
125 I advise the reader to read the following Norwegian article piece: André Bjugstad, “Jeg misliker å være 
homofil. Stempelet tar knekken på meg,” Aftenposten, October 23, 2016, 
http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/sid/Jeg-misliker-a-vare-homofil-Stempelet-tar-knekken-pa-meg-
607210b.html  
126 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge. History of Sexuality: Volume One, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, 
CA: Penguin Group, 1998), 94. 
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including domination relations which are not only limited to the relation between man and 
woman. The hegemonic effects of domination relations extend to sexual orientation, race, and 
social class amongst others. I highlight these relations because in my argument of shame as a 
Foucauldian power, the productions of gendered subjectivities that shame reinforce are 
influenced by ideals of masculinity and femininity in an intersectional matter. Understandings 
of race, sexuality, and social class have influenced different forms of expressing subjectivity.127 
Still, it seems that in his volumes on the history of sexuality, Foucault believed that sex, in its 
production, came to be one of the most signifying forces in subjectivation: “It is through sex – 
in fact, an imaginary point determined by the deployment of sexuality – that each individual 
has to pass in order to have access to his own intelligibility […], to the whole of his body […], 
to his identity.”128 It seems then that the thought is that in sex, in the knowledge of a person’s 
pleasure, a person’s identity and nature is revealed.129 This revelatory “nature,” however, seems 
laden in that Scientia Sexualis has historically categorised “right” and “wrong” kinds of nature 
– “normal” and “abnormal.” Shame also operates with categories of “right” and “wrong,” 
“normal” and “abnormal.” When we shame each other, we communicate about “right” and 
“wrong” ways of being. Especially in relation to sex, shame seems to subjectivate the individual 
in that it reveals to the individual what is the “right” way of being when shaming for the 
“wrong” way of being. As such, shame disciplines the individual. 
To recapitulate, there was an increase during the 17th century and into the 20th century 
of investigations relating to sex using methods of collecting information about individuals 
through their confessions. Foucault calls this specific method for Scientia Sexualis. The 
development of Scientia Sexualis contributed to the evolvement of new knowledge-productions 
and specific forms of discourses, such as that on sexual subjectivity. In the analysis of the data 
collected from the confessions, categories of “normal” and “abnormal” sexualities and ways of 
being were produced. In this production process, the individual was treated as an object to be 
studied, as someone where “truth” could be withdrawn from. However, the individual could 
also learn about him- or herself. In this learning process a person was objectified and 
individualised – knowledge of sexual subjectivities was produced. Further, I have tried to show 
that shame shares characteristics with Scientia Sexualis. Some of these characteristics include 
that of confessions and how shame reinforces sexual subjectivities. One way of potentially 
 
127 I elaborate on this in the section further below. 
128 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge. History of Sexuality: Volume One, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, 
CA: Penguin Group, 1998), 155. 
129 Lisa Downing, The Cambridge Introduction to Michel Foucault (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 88. 
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alleviating shame is through confession. By confessing what I am ashamed of, I am admitting 
something about myself that is “abnormal” or “wrong” – something about myself that I believe 
(perhaps wrongly) that I should not be. If I did not feel less than what is expected or feel that 
my being is wrong in some way, I would most likely not feel shame and the need to alleviate 
that shame. By ways of confession, information is produced that becomes part of the knowledge 
discourse and, also, the production of sexual subjectivities (when the confessions, as they often 
do, relate to sex). The sexual subjectivities vary depending on gender, sexuality, race, and social 
class. Because Foucault does not include all these depending factors in his theories, my 
discussion on Foucault and power will now move on to look at what different reality is produced 
for the female body and sex, and notions of femininity. 
 
Feminine Corporealities 
My thesis deals with how shame shapes normative ideals of subjectivity, and I argue that shame 
can be understood in aspect of a Foucauldian power. The normative ideals of subjectivity seem 
to be different for women and men, and shame contributes to such gendered norms of 
subjectivity. In exploration of normative powers of subjectivity, I will now go further into a 
gendered analysis of disciplinary power, docile bodies, and sexuality because Foucault focuses 
mainly on male bodies in his discussion on disciplinary power, docile bodies, and sexuality. 
Further, I employ a gendered analysis to highlight how female docility has a different 
subjugation and a different performativity by showcasing specific examples from everyday life. 
Bartky argues that there is a lack of feminine corporeality in Foucault’s work as she points out 
that “Foucault treats the body throughout as if it were one, as if the bodily experiences of men 
and women did not differ.”130 I will here explore accounts of how feminine corporealities are 
disciplined differently. However, I will also show cases where we might say that Foucault 
discusses feminine corporealities. For instance, his work on homosexuality as femininity shows 
that femininity does not have to exclusively belong to the female body.131 Lastly, when 
considering shame, we can get an insight into the production, exercise, and experiences of 
feminine corporealities.  
Bartky argues that Foucault treats the body in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
 
130 Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 1990), 65. 
131 It needs to be noted that homosexuality does not have to be feminine. It can be feminine; it can be masculine. 
It does not have to be simply one way of expressing.   
Page 44 of 76 
 
Prison as if it was only one body, as if “men and women bore the same relationship to the 
characteristic institutions of modern life.”132 Further, Bartky highlights three categories of 
disciplines that aim to produce a feminine body: (1) dieting and exercise, (2) body movements, 
and (3) body decoration. These practices are often enforced and reinforced through individuals 
shaming each other. Shame does not only produce gendered subjectivities, but also gendered 
bodies; we are not born feminine or masculine.  
Dieting and exercise routines are supposed to subjugate the body into specific shapes. 
In the Western world, the beauty ideal for women includes Whiteness, thin, a thigh gap, and 
there has been an increase in acceptance of a muscular and lean body that is not too bulky. If it 
is too bulky, it seems the body is deemed too masculine and the woman will lose traits of her 
womanhood. The skinny body ideal is not limited to the West. In China, the pressure to be thin 
for women is so high that there even was a Collarbone Challenge where the number of coins 
you can balance against your collarbone indicates your level of sexy and skinniness – levels of 
supposedly ideal womanhood. Bartky’s first category of disciplining the body for femininity is 
dieting, which monitors the bodies appetite, and exercise, which regulates the body’s fitness 
level.133 Where men’s bodies should be big and strong, women’s bodies should be small and 
slender.134 When other’s shame you for what you eat, or for the shape of your body, you very 
often become subjugated into dieting and exercising, or overeating, for unhealthy reasons such 
as trying to live up to unrealistic standards of what it means to be feminine. Reasons which 
often lead to eating disorders, which can increase the chances of depression and suicidal 
thoughts. I would add cosmetic surgery to Bartky’s category of dieting and exercise that 
subjugates the female body into specific feminine body shapes. Body shaming leads many to 
seek the knife to, for instance, increase their breasts, reduce their breasts, get face lifts to reduce 
wrinkles, and tighten their labia to become ever more closer to a female feminine body ideal 
and to avoid shaming. It should be noted, though, that in her arguments, Bartky is focusing on 
feminine as female. I think in her narrow focus of feminine, she falls short in a similar manner 
to Foucault. Where she argues Foucault is neglecting feminine bodies, she neglects that 
feminine bodies do not have to be exclusively female.  
As for bodily movements, which also includes posture and gestures, Bartky argues that 
 
132Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 1990), 65. 
133 Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 1990), 66. 
134 This is when we look at men’s and women’s bodies in a heteronormative perspective. There can be different 
expectations of this depending on, for instance, queer communities, race, and intersectionality of these.  
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women’s bodily movements are more restricted, but that it also should be graceful: “Woman’s 
space is not a field in which her bodily intentionality can be freely realised but an enclosure in 
which she feels herself positioned and by which she is confined.”135 During a woman’s 
menstruation she must make sure that what she does to her body and the activities she engages 
in does not expose that she is on her period. She must keep herself clean and not appear soiled 
in society, she must maintain a level of grace, and, according to Sonia Kruks: 
 
In such ways, a young woman learns how to develop those practices of self-surveillance 
and self-discipline that Foucault attributes to the panoptic gaze. But they are not the direct 
effect of the gaze itself, so much as of the shame with which it forces her to see “herself.” 
Shame, as what we might call a primary structure of a woman’s lived experience, extends 
far beyond her relationship to menstruation, and it becomes integral to a generalized sense 
of inferiority of the feminine body-subject.136 
 
Kruks’ analysis resonates with both Manion’s notion of shame where we are forced to evaluate 
what we value, and Lehtinen’s underdog shame which is pervaded by feelings of inferiority that 
are a result of enduring life events. I would add that the panoptic gaze is a shaming gaze for 
marginalised groups of people. Shame is a feeling, like Kruks points out in its force to see 
ourselves, but in that sense it is also an action. Through the action of forcing us to see ourselves, 
shame also shows that it is an action. For instance, the shaming gaze of others can force us to 
make sure that we are adhering to social norms, such as beauty regimen. Regimens take up our 
time and mental capacity that we could use on other things. We can choose to look away from 
what we have seen about ourselves and keep on with the beauty regimens (sometimes it feels 
easier to just follow and be accepted as one of the group), or we can choose to evaluate what 
we are seeing and reflect on whether we should make some changes or not to our beauty 
regimen. The panoptic gaze operates differently for women and men, for people of different 
races and sexualities because of different norms and ideals within the different groups and 
communities. Often, we do not belong strictly to one social group and it can therefore be 
difficult to navigate how to express ourselves and still feel like we belong.137  The shaming gaze 
can therefore produce different gendered bodies and gendered subjectivities. Through this 
 
135 Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 1990), 67. 
136 Sonia Kruks, Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2001), 64. 
137 Of course, we can question if “needing to belong” should be an aim, and what exactly defines the different 
ways in which we can belong. I will not explore this further here, but it is important to note since needing to 
belong in some sense seems important to many of us as human beings. 
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shaming gaze we can see the force of shame in Foucauldian power.  
Concerning body decorations, Bartky argues that a woman’s body is an ornamented 
surface where the role of make-up, skin care and clothing become forces of subjugating women. 
There is a whole industry with competing companies catering to women so they can ensure that 
their skin is soft, smooth, hairless (legs, thighs, pubic hair, eyebrows should be plucked, 
moustache can be waxed) and with little to no sign of aging.138 There are methods which require 
regular maintenance, but also painful and expensive procedures which have more long-lasting 
effects, and some that remove hair permanently. There are many instructions for how to provide 
good hair and skin care, how to keep your hands and feet smooth and feminine with pedicures 
and manicures. Women must learn the proper manipulations of the relevant tools to maintain 
the regimen of feminine beauty, including curling iron, flat iron, eyeliner, eyelash curler, 
mascara brush, “and the correct manner of application of a wide variety of products – 
foundation, toner, … eye gloss, blusher, lipstick, … hair dye, … “hair relaxer,” etc.”139  
While there has been an increase in beauty products and grooming for men, it is not to 
the same volume as it is for women. However, this can differ according to race and sexuality. 
For instance, there might be more of a pressure for heterosexual Black men and homosexual 
men to groom compared to White heterosexual men, which again highlights the importance of 
intersectionality. Focusing on the female body, grooming practices are part of disciplining and 
subjugating the female body into a feminine body, and feminine beauty regimens also vary 
depending on culture. With a White beauty ideal being prevalent worldwide, many women of 
colour avoid being out in the sun or they try to bleach their skin which can cause nerve, kidney, 
or liver damage. There is also a massive usage of hair relaxer among the female Black 
community, which can be seen as a way to emulate traditionally European looking hair.140 
Underdog and aristocrat shame can be a dynamic between women, in addition to be a dynamic 
between women and men. A White woman will most likely feel aristocrat shame in relation to 
a woman of colour, who will most likely feel underdog shame when trying to conform to 
specifically White standards of beauty. This dynamic of underdog and aristocrat shame, where 
White women most likely feel aristocrat shame and Black women most likely feel underdog 
shame, does not have to be the case, though. It is more of a general trend on a macrolevel in the 
 
138 Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 1990), 69. 
139 Ibid., 71. 
140 However, there is disagreement and continuous discussions if hair relaxer is an assimilation into Whiteness or 
not.  
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world. However, this trend is changing. Black Girl Magic is a great example of how the White-
other dynamic is changing. Black Girl Magic is a movement and way of being that celebrates 
“the beauty, intelligence, and power of Black women everywhere.”141 It is a movement of 
empowerment that recognises Black women in their own right and not in comparison to White 
people.  
As I have noted previously in this chapter, feminine bodies are not just female bodies. 
As earlier quoted from Bartky, “we are born male or female, but not masculine or feminine.”142 
Bartky’s quote challenges her own claims that Foucault does not discuss feminine 
corporealities. Foucault discusses passivity – associated with femininity – in relation to erotic 
pleasures between men during the times of the Ancient Greeks, amongst others.143 If a 
homosexual man’s sexuality is accepted for who he is, it is very often on the basis of his 
femininity. The stereotype is that a man can be homosexual if he is feminine. This is mostly 
related to heteronormative ideals that indicate that he is not a “real” man because a “real” man 
is masculine. The femininity stereotype of homosexuals is not threatening to the heterosexual 
man, and many find it then easier to wrap their head around understanding that a man can be 
homosexual. Feminine homosexuals also undergo a beauty regime for grooming their bodies, 
some of which overlap with female bodies as mentioned above, whilst some are more common 
in the white homosexual community such as anal bleaching. Further, you also have heterosexual 
men who are feminine as well as masculine, such as drag queens who volumize the performance 
of femininity. Many of whom are shamed for their feminine performance. The male feminine 
bodies experience a different corporeality compared to female feminine bodies.  
Transgender people also experience a different corporeality. For instance, someone who 
was labelled male by birth, but have gone through a transformation and express their identity 
as a woman must often be even more diligent with their beauty regimen and feminine 
performance because they are constantly shamed into fear of expressing and performing who 
they are as a woman. Many transgender people put a lot of work into passing in our 
heteronormative society because they are constantly policed. The toilet and wardrobe debate 
are prime examples of this. Transgender people often struggle with feeling confident in which 
 
141 Sydney Gore, “44 Women Weigh in on the Meaning of ‘Black Girl Magic,’” Nylon, accessed on March 20, 
2021 https://www.nylon.com/articles/meaning-of-black-girl-magic 
142 Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 1990), 65. 
143 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure. History of Sexuality: Volume Two, trans. Robert Hurley (Toronto, CA: 
Penguin Group, 1992); Michel Foucault, The Care of the Self. History of Sexuality: Volume Three, trans. 
Robert Hurley (Toronto, CA: Penguin Group, 1990). 
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toilet they should use in public restrooms or which wardrobe they should use if at a gym. Also, 
they are often prone to receive comments that question if they belong in that public space. The 
examples of what transgender people experience, what people of colour experience, what the 
members of the queer community experience in the heteronormative world, show that different 
types of feminine bodies have different experiences of shamed subjectivities contingent on 
different power relations. Different feminine corporealities can experience underdog shame and 
aristocrat shame contingent on power relations; these two types of shame do not belong strictly 
to the woman-man relation. 
When transgender people perform femininity, when we all perform different expressions 
of gender, race, and sexuality, it is not a theatrical performance I refer to. It is Judith Butler’s 
term performativity, and she explores the term particularly through that of gender. According 
to Butler,  
 
[t]o say that gender is performative is to say that it is a certain kind of enactment; the 
‘appearance’ of gender is often mistaken as a sign of its internal or inherent truth; gender 
is prompted by obligatory norms to be one gender or the other (usually within a strict 
binary frame), and the reproduction of gender is thus always a negotiation with power; 
and finally, there is no gender without this reproduction of norms that risks undoing or 
redoing the norm in unexpected ways, thus opening up the possibility of a remaking of 
gendered reality along new lines.144 
 
When Butler states that “gender is often mistaken as a sign of its internal or inherent truth,”145 
she means that gender is not an a priori truth. It is not a fact beyond its construction. Since 
gender is constructed, its construction can also change. For instance, what is stereotypically 
associated with feminine is female, but transgender people challenge this association. However, 
as Butler points out, we live in a strict binary frame (male vs female). So, if we try to change 
how we express gender to create new constructions, it will be very difficult and met with a lot 
of resistance. There is a negotiation with power, a question of who gets to express what gender 
norms. In light of Scientia Sexualis and the different knowledge productions discussed above 
in relation to shame, gender norms are reproduced through internalised ideals and norms. Ideals 
and norms that are communicated as “truths” we should strive to uphold. With these internalised 
“truths” as our guides, women stereotypically pick out clothes to pass as feminine so not to 
 
144 Judith Butler, “Performativity, Precarity and Sexual Politics,” AIBR: Revista de Antropología Iberoamericana 
4, no. 3 (2009), i. 
145 Ibid. 
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deviate from the norm. Deviating from the norm opens the possibility to be exposed to shaming 
and pain. When buying from the women’s department in the clothing store, our purchase habits 
are tracked and fed back to production companies that these are the clothes women want. This 
consumer and producer cycle of gender categorisation in the clothing industry, contribute to 
reproducing the binary gender norms and the possibilities of creating new gender roles.  
 Even though it may seem impossible to break gender norms and create new 
constructions because of the strong power relations at play, I think that Manion’s transformative 
power of shame has the potential to contribute to creating new constructions of gender norms. 
Let us imagine an adult man named Edgar who wants to wear nail polish to his office, but he 
has never dared to in fear of being labelled less of a man, ridiculed, and shamed by his 
colleagues. The discussions at his office sometimes convey that if you are a feminine man, you 
are less of a man and you are usually a homosexual. Discussions which state that a feminine 
man and a homosexual man are not fully men. Unfortunately, these are not uncommon beliefs 
and I have witnessed and challenged such discussions myself. Edgar’s effort to avoid being 
shamed publicly by colleagues is in conflict with his desire to wear nail polish whenever he 
wants to. He might even feel ashamed for having the desire to wear nail polish. If he wears nail 
polish he does not pass as full man. The conflict of his shame and his desire can bring about a 
state of torment or of questioning his own beliefs. What does he most desire? Be accepted and 
respected by his colleagues or follow his passion for nail polish? The conflicts bring about a 
reflection about how to express himself. If he wants to conform with expectations, he will 
reproduce gender norms since females stereotypically wear nail polish. If he sees his desire to 
wear nail polish is stronger and decides to act upon it, he will break the pattern of gender norms 
and contribute to creating new ones. Norms which open for more people to wear nail polish 
without it diminishing their sense of manhood. Even though it might take a while for Edgar to 
feel confident wearing nail polish and his colleagues to get over the fact that Edgar wears nail 
polish, it is a start.  However, it should be noted that there is change among the younger 
generation regarding gender norms compared to older generations. There is a much wider 
respect and acceptance for boys to wear nail polish, skirts, or dresses. This can vary 
geographically across national borders and within national borders. Stereotypically, there are 
more traditional gender norms for boys in the countryside. 
 Further, I use the example of nail polish for men because nail polish might seem like 
such a small thing that there are bigger issues concerning gender that should be handled. 
However, I believe the example of nail polish show how strict gender norms are. When we 
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question someone’s manhood based on a small thing as nail polish, it can point to how difficult 
it is to create new and more inclusive gender norms on a larger scale. When shame forces us to 
reflect on why we feel shame, we are forced to choose between at least two things: if we want 
to conform with norms to stop feeling shame or if we want distance ourselves from strict norms 
and create new ways of being and expressing ourselves. By choosing to create new ways of 
expressing ourselves that challenge gender norms, we can see that shame has the potential to 
break strict gender norms and contribute to creating new ones.  
To summarise, I have tried to show that women and men can have different 
corporealities when exploring how they might be subjugated differently, something it seems 
Foucault neglects to give proper attention to in his analysis. I have here tried to show how 
feminine docility can have a different docility than masculine docility. Women have a very strict 
and extensive beauty regiment to follow in trying to adhere to the beauty norms for a feminine 
body. If women do not adhere to this, if they stray too far away from the feminine ideals, they 
are often shamed back into a “proper” femininity. Body shaming does not only happen for 
female feminine bodies, but for transgender people and male feminine bodies as well. Because 
of the different relations to femininity that different bodies express, there is also a difference in 
the type of shame they experience. For instance, female bodies from different cultures can 
experience underdog and aristocrat shame in relation to each other and ideals of feminine 
subjectivity, depending on their individual placements in the social hierarchy. Those outside the 
heteronormative binary, such as transgender people, will often also experience underdog shame 
because of a different corporeality when expressing their subjectivity; their performance 
“needs” to pass as legitimate, and it does so by not threaten heteronormative society.  
 
Summary 
Foucault understands power as something that is exercised rather than possessed. In its exercise, 
knowledge which also informs the individual how to behave within the social body, is produced. 
Disciplinary power regulates and subjugates individuals to fit into norms through surveillance, 
examinations and recordings. With regards to my thesis of understanding shame as a 
Foucauldian notion of power in producing gendered subjectivities, shaming also informs the 
individual on how to behave and disciplines individuals to fit norms through surveillance by 
shaming, and self-regulating our ways of being in accordance to the standardised body ideal. 
Power objectifies and subjectifies in its gathering of information and production of individuals. 
Disciplinary power is one modality of power in which this occurs, so is sex. By collection of 
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information from people’s confessions and the discourse that evolved, a sexual subjectivity was 
produced, and this demonstrate how intimately power and knowledge are intertwined in the 
exercise of power at all levels of society. Foucault calls this Scientia Sexualis. Shame has 
characteristics of Foucault’s Scientia Sexualis in its relation to confessions, but also in the way 
shame reinforces sexual subjectivities. The sexual subjectivities vary depending on gender, 
sexuality, race, how it is understood differently through history, and social class. 
In much of his work on disciplinary power and sex, Foucault treats the body as male 
throughout. Bartky and Kruks argue for a different subjugation of the female body where the 
disciplinary practices for women are very strict and extensive in its relation to beauty and 
femininity. If women do not adhere to this, if they stray too far away from the ideals of 
femininity, they are shamed back into femininity by men, but also by fellow women. Because 
the female body looks different from culture to culture but there is an overarching beauty ideal 
of the White Western body, women can experience underdog and aristocrat shame in relation 
to each other depending on how close they are to the beauty ideal of femininity. Lastly, the 
experiences and shame of feminine corporealities do not only belong to the female body as 
there are transgender people and other male feminine bodies who also experience shame for 
trying to adhere to, or being too close to, the strict regimen of feminine gender norms. Even 
though it is difficult to create new gender norms, partly because of a strict binary notion of 
gender, there is the potential to create new and more inclusive gender norms though the 
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Shame and its Moral Relevance 
So far in my thesis, I have analysed how shame operates as a norm regulator for expressing 
gendered subjectivities. I have demonstrated how we can create new and more inclusive 
constructions of gender through the transformative power of shame. In the previous chapter, I 
looked at how we can view shame through a Foucauldian notion of power by examining shame 
in relation to disciplinary power, subjugation, and the history of sexuality. I explored how 
shame informs individuals about how they ought to behave to fit norms. Particularly, I looked 
at how we regulate our ways of being in adherence to gendered norms of subjectivity through 
shaming each other and self-shaming.  
Furthermore, I investigated feminine corporealities in relation to Foucault’s work and 
how shame gives an insight into the production of different feminine corporealities. Productions 
of different feminine corporealities show that shame can contribute to the production of 
hierarchical structures. Additionally, depending on the hierarchical relations between different 
social groups, it will vary who feels underdog shame and who feels aristocrat shame.146 An 
individual can feel underdog shame in relation to one social group and aristocrat shame in 
relation to another social group, depending on the individual’s social standing within the two 
different social groups. A White woman might stereotypically feel underdog shame in relation 
to a White man, but she might feel aristocrat shame in relation to a Black woman who 
stereotypically feels underdog shame in this relation.  
In this chapter, I will look at moral shame and guilt and how they guide our behaviour. 
Generally, we want to be better human beings and improve society. Morality is a guide for how 
we can improve society and ourselves. It can be difficult to distinguish moral shame and moral 
guilt since they often occur simultaneously, and they can overlap in their qualities. To 
understand moral shame, I also need to present aspects of moral guilt. I will explore moral 
shame and moral guilt because my thesis deals with how shame shapes normative ideals of 
expressing gendered subjectivities, and how moral shame can falsely present ideals to strive 
for. Moral shame has at least two sides to it: a false moral shame and a more legitimate moral 
shame. In regulating behaviour, shame can falsely portray that certain ideals and values have 
moral weight. This is particularly present in specific ideals of masculinity and femininity. I 
believe that being a good person is not dependent on your gender; that how masculine or 
 
146 For a discussion on underdog and aristocrat shame, see chapter “Shame, Guilt and Gendered Experiences,” 
section “Gendered Experiences of Shame” of this thesis or read Ullaliina Lehtinen, “How Does One Know What 
Shame is? Epistemology, Emotions, and Forms of Life in Juxtaposition,” Hypatia 13, no. 1 (1998). 
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feminine you are does not dictate how good of a human being you are. When we give gendered 
ideals moral value and shame each other if we do not adhere to gendered ideals, shame is not 
morally relevant and present itself as a false moral shame. I will explore this further in the last 
section of this chapter.   
However, a more legitimate moral shame is where we feel ashamed for not living up to 
moral values such as honesty, kindness, and honour. Moral shame can be beneficial. For 
instance, shame can help prevent stealing. If you are caught stealing a banana, you will be guilty 
of the act, but you might also feel ashamed of what your action might reflect on you as a person. 
Stealing could imply that you are a dishonest person with no respect for other people’s 
properties and that you are leeching from others in society. Being labelled a thief, you might 
not get the same access to participate in society and do other things that you want. For instance, 
you might not attain the jobs that you want because you have a criminal record, and your 
potential employer might not trust you. You might feel ashamed of your past and how it could 
determine your future if others found out. So, to avoid feeling shame, you avoid stealing.  
I will first explore moral guilt and moral shame by looking at how shame and guilt are 
connected to different moral notions. Through the work of R.E. Lamb, I will analyse shame and 
guilt in relation to responsibility. Since Lamb claims only guilt is essentially connected to 
morality, I will use Anthony O’Hear to investigate honour’s relation to morality and shame. 
Through O’Hear, I intend to illustrate that different notions of morality, e.g., responsibility and 
honour, can prompt different moral guides, i.e. guilt and shame, for our behaviour. O’Hear 
highlights the challenges of developing a sense of moral guilt without elements of law and 
authority, thus arguing that moral guilt cannot cover morality on its own accord. I will challenge 
O’Hear’s notion of honour by showing how honour can be connected to guilt as well as shame.  
Next, I will draw on Jan-Olav Henriksen and Terje Mesel’s investigation on shame in 
moral transgressions and how they place value on moral guilt instead of moral shame.147 I will 
explore if moral shame can provide us with any information about how we can behave. 
Henriksen and Mesel conclude that shame ought to have minimal space in society, since it 
cannot provide us with much useful information. I will examine why they make this claim when 
they also recognise Manion’s positive aspect of shame through its transformative power. Lastly, 
 
147 Jan Olav Henriksen and Terje Mesel, “Shame and Morality,” in Shame’s Unwelcome Interruption and 
Responsive Movements. Body, Religion, Morality – an Interdisciplinary Study (NOASP, Cappelen Damm 
Akademisk, 2021), 269-336. 
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I will look at how shame might falsely present itself as a moral guide, by specifically looking 
at regulations of gendered ideals.  
 
Moral Shame, Moral Guilt, and Responsibility 
As discussed in chapter “Shame, Guilt, and Gendered Experiences,” section “Shame and Guilt,” 
shame and guilt are very much intertwined even though we try to distinguish them. Feelings of 
shame and guilt can often be present simultaneously which makes it difficult to distinguish 
them. Sometimes we feel shame over our actions even though it is guilt we usually associate as 
the appropriate feeling when we have done something wrong. In distinguishing between moral 
shame and moral guilt, I will draw on Lamb’s distinction and look at why he claims only guilt 
is essentially connected to morality.148 Lamb specifically looks at responsibility as a central 
notion to morality when exploring the moral relevance of guilt and shame. According to Lamb, 
guilt is essentially connected to moral notions, whereas shame is contingently connected to 
moral notions. Lamb argues that we morally judge ourselves and others on whether we have 
fulfilled the responsibility of acquiring abilities we ought to have.149 By linking the assessment 
of moral behaviour to responsibility he concludes that it is guilt that ought to act as our moral 
system. He concludes that shame-systems can be successful ways of regulating behaviour, but 
that to call shame moral is simply a confusion.150 
Lamb looks at how both guilt and shame are systems of regulating behaviour. He further 
looks at how they are moral emotions in relation to responsibility since he highlights 
responsibility as one of morality’s central notions. I will distinguish moral shame from guilt by 
looking at how he claims that shame is contingently connected to notions of morality and that 
guilt is a system that is essentially connected to notions of morality.151 Lamb says that “morality 
may suffer no essential injury when the possibility of shame is removed, but the excision of 
guilt cuts off its head.”152 To explain, Lamb argues that “a state which one can bring only upon 
oneself is precisely the sort of state required by [guilt or shame to be moral].”153 He claims that 
since others can shame us, and we can put others to shame through our actions, shame is not 
something which we can only bring upon ourselves. Guilt, according to Lamb, is not something 
 
148 R.E. Lamb, “Guilt, Shame, and Morality,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43, no. 3 (1983): 329-
346. 
149 Ibid., 341.  
150 Ibid., 346. 
151 Ibid., 345. 
152 Ibid., 342. 
153 Ibid., 339. Emphasis in original. 
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you can bring upon others and others cannot bring guilt upon you. He argues that you do “not 
manage to put someone else in the ‘state’ or ‘condition’ of guilt, solely by virtue of what [you 
do yourself].”154  
He looks at a specific case of shame where we feel shame because of our actions and 
responsibility, when claiming that shame is only contingently connected to morality. To 
illustrate, Lamb differentiates between being shamed and doing something shameful. People 
are not in themselves shameful, but Lamb points out that we can say that they ought to feel 
ashamed if they have done something shameful.155 However, people might be shamed 
“irrespective of whether [they] have done anything shameful, irrespective of whether [they] 
ought to be ashamed. By contrast it is necessary” that for someone to be guilty, they themselves 
must perform an action of a certain type.156 The certain type of action Lamb refers to here is an 
act where only you bring a state upon yourself and not others, and this is essential to morality. 
Since others can put you in a state of shame even when you have not done something shameful, 
Lamb claims morality suffers no essential injury when the possibility of shame is removed, but 
morality does suffer essential injury if guilt is removed.  
Additionally, he claims that shame is not essentially connected to morality since others 
can shame us when we are not responsible for the act that puts us to shame.157 Lamb argues 
that: 
 
[W]e are not, in general, morally obliged to have abilities or capacities, even though we 
may be morally obliged to take certain steps to acquire, i.e., with the aim of acquiring, 
abilities. Consequently, we do not blame, i.e., morally censure, people for not having 
abilities, though we do blame them when they do nothing by way of an attempt to acquire 
abilities they ought to have.158 
 
To illustrate, sometimes we are shamed by others for not being honest. In this case, we are 
responsible for not being honest, and if honesty is a moral virtue, then we should rightly feel 
ashamed. However, Lamb highlights that we cannot hold people morally responsible for 
abilities they are unable to acquire or do anything about. This aspect of accountability, however, 
does not stop people from shaming each other in situations where individuals are not 
 
154 Ibid., 340. Emphasis in original. 
155 Ibid., 331. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid., 339. 
158 Ibid., 341. Emphasis in original.  
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responsible for the acts that put them to shame. In these instances, shame is not moral but rather 
a means of social control to obtain cohesion and a specific order within a society. Since it can 
be confusing for an individual to differentiate when shame is moral or not, Lamb thinks that it 
is a confusion to say that shame is moral.  
Furthermore, he claims that we feel ashamed of our actions when we believe that we 
ought to have the ability or capacity to do otherwise in a moral sense.159 Here, we feel a sense 
of responsibility though Lamb say we are not necessarily morally responsible for the act. Lamb 
does not give an explicit example to illustrate this. He does specify that it is a case where we 
feel ashamed about an action that is our own and where we do not bring shame on others. I will 
try to illustrate a case where someone might feel shame for an action that is their own but where 
they might not be responsible for their actions. Imagine that Sally witnessed someone rob a 
person named Edgar. For the sake of the argument, let us imagine that Sally was stronger than 
the robber, the robber did not have any weapons, and that Sally was also faster than the robber. 
When she witnessed the robbery, Sally froze with fear and was not able to act or do anything 
to help Edgar. In the aftermath, she feels ashamed because she believes she ought to have been 
able to help Edgar to prevent the robbery; that she might not be a good person for not helping 
Edgar. Let us also imagine that others shamed Sally because they also believe she ought to have 
acted in some way to help prevent the robbery, instead of simply being a bystander witness. In 
Sally’s case she did not have the capacity to help Edgar because her fear was hindering her. 
Sally might feel ashamed that she was not able to help, but she was not responsible for not 
having the capacity to help. According to Lamb, we do not morally censure her because she 
lacked the capacity to act due to her fears. However, others might still put her to shame for 
being a bystander witness. Lamb therefore claims that since you can put someone to shame, 
regardless of the action being moral or not, shame is only contingently connected to morality.  
Following Lamb’s argument, we would blame her if she did nothing to try to overcome 
her fears so she could potentially help others who suffer injury in the future. Sally might feel 
ashamed that she was not able to help, but she was not responsible for not having the capacity 
to help. However, if she in the future does not take actions to acquire the capacity, Lamb would 
think that it is more logical to say that Sally is guilty of not following up on her moral 
responsibility. In addition to guilt, she might feel ashamed for not following up on her moral 
obligations. However, feeling ashamed does not tie directly to her responsibility to acquire the 
capacity to act or overcome her fears. According to Lamb, feeling ashamed is secondary to 
 
159 Ibid., 341. 
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being guilty since she might stop feeling ashamed even if she does not follow up on her fears. 
In line with Lamb’s argument, the absence of shame would not take away her responsibility to 
overcome her fears so she can act in the future. If she does not follow up on her responsibility, 
we blame her for not doing anything to acquire the capacity to act. We, according to Lamb’s 
argument, find her guilty of not taking action. In this regard, Lamb finds that guilt is essentially 
connected to the moral notions while shame is only contingently so. He concludes that shame-
systems can be successful ways of regulating behaviour, but that to call shame moral is simply 
a confusion.160 
Additionally, Lamb highlights that shame is something you can bring upon yourself as 
well as others because of your actions. Here, he distinguishes shame as an emotion and shame 
as non-emotion.161 For instance, let us imagine Sally. Let us say she was dishonest in a setting 
where she was representing her family. Through her dishonest acts, Lamb would claim that she 
might put her family to shame. She might not feel ashamed herself (shame as an emotion), but 
her dishonest acts might put her family to shame by “bring[ing] dishonour on the family 
name.”162 She might also put herself to shame without feeling shame. When she puts her family 
name, or herself, to shame, shame operates as a condition or a state rather than an emotion. 
However, since Lamb claims that the action that is essential to morality is one where only you 
bring a state upon yourself and not others, shame as a state is a moral confusion. 
 As mentioned in the beginning of this section, Lamb focuses specifically on 
responsibility as a moral notion. It is not controversial to claim that responsibility is central to 
morality, but that does not mean that other notions, such as honour, can be central notions of 
morality. Lamb briefly mentions honour but does not explore if honour can be a central notion 
of morality.163 He dismisses honour because he claims we cannot think that what we did was 
honourable if we are ashamed of that action, but we can think that what we did was honourable 
even though we are guilty of a crime.164 If he had explored honour more in depth as a central 
notion of morality, it might be that he had seen that shame is more morally relevant than he 
initially claims. O’Hear examines honour in relation to shame and morality.  
 
 
160 Ibid., 346. 
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Moral Shame, Moral Guilt, and Honour 
O’Hear explores morality in relation to honour. He argues that shame can account for aspects 
of morality which guilt cannot. According to O’Hear, moral guilt is too legalistic and therefore 
does not account for all aspects of morality. He does not dismiss guilt as morally relevant but 
claims that since guilt is very legalistic with its connection to the authorities we adhere to and 
actual laws, there are non-legalistic aspects of morality that shame can account for instead. 
O’Hear writes that “The difficulty…is to develop a sense of moral guilt which can do without 
the elements of law, authority and liability to punishment which characterise guilt in the legal 
Judaeo-Christian context.”165 According to O’Hear, the elements of guilt are similar to Judaeo-
Christian ethics and they are characterised by “law, authority and [that] punishments are 
prominent.”166 Since he likens moral guilt to the legal elements of Judaeo-Christian ethics, he 
finds that it is difficult to develop a sense of moral guilt that is not too legalistic. By legalistic, 
O’Hear means that guilt “involves the notions of a broken law, a relevant authority and 
consequent liability to punishment.”167 He states that these features are present in the Judaeo-
Christian ethic and that the moral guilt in this ethic and legal guilt are strikingly similar.168 
When exploring if moral guilt can exist outside the legal context, He goes through Rawls three 
stages of the development of genuine moral sense of guilt and compares how they are similar 
to legal guilt as characterised by Judaeo-Christianity. 
 The first stage O’Hear refers to is the authority stage which “is felt by children when 
they disobey the commands of their parents.”169 Parents can also be replaced by God as an 
authority of command. Here, O’Hear claims that “clearly, authority guilt shares with legal and 
‘Judaeo-Christian’ guilt the central elements of an authority, its commands and 
punishments.”170 The second stage is association guilt which “arises from group participation 
in joint activities, such as games or social institutions. On breaking mutual bonds…one will 
show a willingness to admit what one has done, accept reproofs and penalties and seek 
reinstatement.”171 Again, O’Hear claims it “is a clear similarity between association guilt and 
legal guilt, the group here being the authority imposing its laws and punishments.”172 The third 
 
165 Anthony O’Hear, “Guilt and Shame as Moral Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1976-
1977): 82. 
166 Ibid., 73. 
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stage is principle guilt which is when “we feel guilty about acting against the spirit of existing 
just institutions or about resisting reforms required to set up new institutions required by the 
principles of justice.”173 O’Hear draws similarities to the third stage of guilt to legalistic aspects 
of guilt by looking at how “just institutions already suggest a quasi-legal perspective.”174 He 
looks at two factors here. The first is that what we consider unjust might also “be forbidden by 
a law one feels bound by.”175 The second factor is that we might “feel bound by a divine 
command to help those in need, and so feel guilty [for] not contributing to famine relief.”176 
However, he questions these three stages through the “case where a man does not see himself 
as being under any prescription to be just, and he is not acting illegally.”177 In this example, 
O’Hear asks what justifies calling the man’s feelings like that of guilt instead of, for example, 
shame.178 Based on these three stages and their characteristics of guilt, O’Hear finds that guilt 
alone cannot account for all aspects of morality. There are instances where we are not morally 
guilty, but where we might be unkind in our actions. In these instances, shame, honour, and 
conduct of character might be more explanatory in accounting for some aspects of morality 
which moral guilt does not account for. Further, he claims that guilt is what we feel when we 
do something which others would condemn. Shame, on the other hand, is something we can 
feel without the need for others’ condemnation. 
 O’Hear argues that “shame is logically dependent on something ‘dishonouring, 
ridiculous, or indecorous in one’s own conduct or circumstances (or in those of others whose 
honour or disgrace one regards as one’s own).”179 In light of this, O’Hear claims that shame has 
a broader scope of what we can feel ashamed about compared to feelings of guilt. He explains 
that this is because we can “feel shame at doing something illegal or immoral, [but also] be 
ashamed of a bad piece of work,….of failing in a supererogatory ideal,….aspects of one’s 
character or taste, elements of one’s upbringing.”180 According to O’Hear, shame is the primary 
moral feeling when you fail to live an honourable life within your society in accordance with 
the values that have been imparted on you through your upbringing in that society.181 Further, 
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he claims that “shame can be felt privately and because of privately held ideals, [and] feeling 
shame involves more than being subject to external sanctions of shame.”182  
O’Hear writes that “once certain types of conduct or character are seen as valuable in 
themselves, independently of their appreciation by others, shame too can operate independently 
of public condemnation of fantasies of public disapproval.”183 A type of character O’Hear refers 
to is one of honour. According to O’Hear, when striving to achieve ideals of the society you 
live in, you lead an honourable life. At first you may try to live by the societal ideals because 
you have been told that this is what is honourable and to be a good person you must live by the 
society’s ideals. If you do not live by the societal ideals, you are at risk of being shamed for not 
being a good person. So, you strive to live according to society’s ideals in order to avoid shame.  
However, there is also a less socially dependent form of honour according to O’Hear. A 
concept of honour where “shame is not tied to fear of exposure, but to a fuller view of personal 
growth, involving ideals such as those of reliability, fairness, decency and fidelity.”184 In this 
case of honour, you act according to ideals of what is considered good because you recognise 
the ideals as good and the right thing to act according to, and not because of fear of being 
publicly shamed or praised. This form of honour is not tied to acting according to a society’s 
ideals, but to higher ideals that you act according to because you recognise that what you do is 
good independent of what you grew up learning.  
To illustrate what O’Hear means, let us look at when women in Saudi Arabia were 
legally allowed to drive in 2018. Women still knew how to drive in Saudi Arabia before this. 
These women had family members, usually fathers, who recognised that even though the law 
states women cannot drive, they felt it was right that women do learn to drive because it would 
provide more freedom for the women. These fathers taught their daughters how to drive a car 
because they believed it was the right thing to do regardless of what the law said and what 
societal norms said. To maintain a sense of personal honour, they taught their daughters to 
drive. Even though women are now allowed to drive, many women and men still do not think 
it is right because by learning to drive a woman might be led astray of her duties as a good 
woman, a good wife, and a good daughter.185 Conservative groups of Saudis believe that they 
are maintaining their sense of honour by not agreeing with the law that women can drive. I will 
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assume here that were they to express that they agreed with this law, they would be afraid of 
public ridicule in their communities.  
In this sense, their honour is still socially dependent on fear of public exposure and 
shaming, and I would therefore claim that their honour is not of the form that is less socially 
dependent; it is the one that is tied to fear of exposure. In the example of fathers teaching their 
daughters to drive even though it was illegal, moral shame gives a better account for moral 
behaviour compared to moral guilt. The fathers’ drive to conduct themselves with honour as a 
father was bigger than following the law. For them, the shame they would have felt if they 
would deny their daughters freedom was bigger than the risk of being caught guilty of breaking 
the law or fear of exposure.186 This example illustrates that shame can be a driving force in 
regulating behaviour in accordance with ideals of who we ought to be. It also shows that there 
are different levels of regulations of who we ought to be and how we ought to behave, that 
occur simultaneously within different subgroups of societies. The higher ideals the fathers 
followed, contribute to produce a subjectivity that they regard as honourable. Indirectly, they 
also contribute to a production of what it means to be a woman; that a woman can have the 
same opportunities as men since the fathers encouraged them to drive to expand their freedom. 
The norms that prevent women to drive, also produce a subjectivity; a subjectivity that is 
different for women and men, but also a subjectivity of fatherhood. A subjectivity where being 
a good father means protecting women from driving since that is not considered part of their 
role as a woman. However, shame’s potential to force you to self-reflect on these norms, made 
some of the fathers reflect on their values and what it means to be a good father compared to 
what the State indirectly said it means.  
 Even though O’Hear connects honour to shame, I find that he does not adequately 
succeed. When distinguishing between the socially dependent and less socially dependent 
forms of honour and using my example of the fathers of the Saudi women, it seems that the 
honourable fathers are following some higher authority of what is right and wrong. O’Hear 
claims that moral guilt occurs when breaking a relevant authority.187 The honour code the 
fathers follow could be a relevant authority here. On such an understanding of honour, honour 
would be connected to moral guilt if breaking the honour code. However, O’Hear does link 
guilt to punishment and suggests that you are free of your guilt if you make a payment through 
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some form of punishment. Since you do not have to be punished or make repayment if you 
break an honour code, honour is not connected to guilt, according to O’Hear’s argument. Then 
again, O’Hear does not explore guilt extensively. If you do break an honour code, or do not 
conduct yourself honourably, there are instances where you are faced with some form of 
punishment. For instance, if you conduct yourself with dishonour, you might be stripped of 
your social position or cast out of the community to live in exile. So, the fathers of the Saudi 
women could be guilty of not following their honour code. However, they could also feel 
ashamed for not being the honourable person that they thought they were; feel ashamed for not 
living up to their own ideals. The question of punishment is more challenging when the honour 
code is personal and not dependent on social norms. It is this form of honour that O’Hear 
focuses on regarding the honour that follows higher ideals. However, I think it is worth noting 
that honour can also have associations of guilt. O’Hear’s work can show us that it is difficult to 
distinguish between moral shame and guilt, but there are instances where shame can better 
account for morality compared to guilt.  
In his account for moral shame, O’Hear adds that moral shame can provide an internal 
motivation for our behaviour. By having a sense of honour without fear of public exposure, but 
perhaps a fear of self-shaming, moral shame can add an internal motivation to our conduct of 
behaviour. By focusing on the legal aspects when moral guilt guides our behaviour, we can find 
that there are external factors that motivate our moral behaviour. Here, it is in order to avoid 
punishment that we do the morally right thing. This can be true for moral shame as well. We 
try to do what is right and be good to avoid shaming. On that note, shame is also an external 
motivator for moral behaviour. However, according to O’Hear, shame has the aspect of honour 
which guilt does not necessarily have. By having a sense of honour where we strive to uphold 
ideals for personal growth, instead of fear of public exposure, honour can be an internal 
motivator for being morally good. Further, if failing to be honourable, we might not care about 
what others think of us, but we care about how we have failed to live up to our own expectations 
of ourselves. By failing to live up to our own expectations, we will most likely feel shame about 
who we perceive ourselves to be. By looking at honour as a central notion to morality, we can 
see that shame has moral relevance in guiding our behaviour.  
 
Moral Shame, Moral Guilt, and the Information they Provide 
According to Henriksen and Mesel, shame ought to have minimal space in human societies 
because shame cannot necessarily show us what or why something is wrong, only that 
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something is wrong.188 They do not specify if they mean that shame can never show us what or 
why something is wrong, but I interpret them not to be absolute in their use of “necessarily.” I 
interpret it this way because they claim that we cannot abolish moral shame since it does provide 
us with some information.189 They argue that shame cannot provide us with information about 
what to do or not to do, but shame tells us only that “we have not met our own or others’ 
expectations and ideals.”190 In this regard, shame tells us that something is wrong and, therefore, 
Henriksen and Mesel argue that it has some space in human societies. Even though it is only a 
minimal space, they recognise its positive function since shame can provide individual 
transformation and self-growth. It seems like a contradiction to recognise self-growth and 
individual transformation through shame, while also claiming that shame ought to have minimal 
space. I will explore how they can state both of these things.  
 Henriksen and Mesel argue that shame mainly provide us with information that says 
something is wrong, but not what or why something is wrong.191 They write: 
 
Among the risks of employing shame in the context of morality is that it makes the shame-
experiencing individual self-occupied or too self-absorbed to achieve the necessary 
distance and clarity that can lead to genuine moral insight and assess the moral challenges 
in ways that are not conditioned by the agent’s concerns for him or herself.192 
 
To develop genuine moral insight, Henriksen and Mesel argues that it is important to have a 
resistance to shame’s influence since they argue that shame should not be morally relevant. To 
have that resistance, they state that you need to be self-reliant in a way where you recognise 
that the interrelations with and dependencies on others contribute to your individuality, increase 
in self-trust, and that the other is an important part of your process of becoming yourself.193 It 
is under these conditions that an individual “can receive the necessary affirmation and 
recognition to create the fundamental conditions for self-trust, self-respect, and self-esteem.”194 
 
188 Jan Olav Henriksen and Terje Mesel, “Shame and Morality,” in Shame’s Unwelcome Interruption and 
Responsive Movements. Body, Religion, Morality – an Interdisciplinary Study (NOASP, Cappelen Damm 
Akademisk, 2021), 336. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid., 335. 
191 Ibid., 336. 
192 Ibid., 296. 
193 Ibid., 296. 
194 Ibid., 287. 
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Furthermore, they claim that shame will not contribute to a self-reliance where you see yourself 
and your growth in relation to others.  
On my reading, I do not find that they extensively explain how shame makes the 
individual too self-absorbed.195 However, considering Dan Zahavi’s isolating aspect of shame, 
where shame can be isolating in that it makes us think that others would not have done or been 
like us,196 shame can make it hard for us to feel connected to others.197 When we do not feel 
connected to others, we can become self-absorbed when feeling shame and not be able to assess 
our actions or who we are from a distance, like Henriksen and Mesel refer to. When we are self-
absorbed, it is hard to see our thoughts and opinions of ourselves from the point of view of 
others. Additionally, when we are self-absorbed it is harder to believe others’ positive opinion 
about us if we have a highly negative view of ourselves. Keeping Zahavi’s argument of shame’s 
isolation in mind, I can see that a resistance to shame can foster self-trust, self-respect, and self-
esteem, on Henriksen and Mesel’s argument. Especially when shame is portrayed as a moral 
guide when it indeed might not be moral. Henriksen and Mesel argue that self-trust, self-respect, 
and self-esteem may still develop if you feel guilt. An individual might be less self-absorbed 
when feeling guilty because feelings of guilt can help differentiate between the action and the 
agent, whereas shame concerns who the individual is.198 When differentiating between the 
action and the agent, it can be easier to see yourself from a distance. In this sense, they argue 
that “moral competencies are better enabled by guilt than by shame.199  
Henriksen and Mesel highlight that shame does not provide us with moral insight since 
it cannot provide us with information about what is wrong or why something is wrong. They 
argue this case by contrasting shame with shamelessness. Where shame is supposed to subject 
an individual to a moral standard, a shameless person would be unwilling to subject their 
character to the same moral standards.200 The “ideals that help us measure the conditions of a 
 
195 Also, Henriksen and Mesel do not specify what they mean by self-absorbed. You can be self-absorbed in a 
way where you are overly confident in yourself and believe that others think you are the most wonderful 
person, when they actually might think less of you. However, I do think they mean self-absorbed in the sense 
where you think incredibly negative of yourself and being connected to others might help you see that you 
are a good person. This interpretation would be more beneficial for their argument.  
196 Dan Zahavi, Self & Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 218. I have discussed the isolating aspect of shame in more depth in “Shame, Guilt, and 
Gendered Experiences,” section “Social and Isolating Aspects of Shame” in this thesis. 
197 Ibid., 223. 
198 Jan Olav Henriksen and Terje Mesel, “Shame and Morality,” in Shame’s Unwelcome Interruption and 
Responsive Movements. Body, Religion, Morality – an Interdisciplinary Study (NOASP, Cappelen Damm 
Akademisk, 2021), 297. 
199 Ibid., 334. 
200 Ibid., 333. 
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good life” are not on the radar for the shameless person.201 Further, the shameless person might 
take joy in not following those standards. In this sense, shame provide us with information that 
we have not met the standards or ideals of others; shame makes us attentive to a feeling that 
something is wrong. Shamelessness, on the other hand, shows us that there might not be a clear 
moral reason as to why we should follow them, or which ideals are good or bad.  
Even though they discredit shame as providing moral insight, they agree with Manion 
on shame’s positive function through its transformative power. When shame tells us that we 
have not met expectations and ideals, “shame may occasionally also function positively as a 
motivating factor to establish deep-going and necessary change.”202 According to Manion, 
experiencing shame can be a positive notion for the moral self as it forces the individual to 
intensely self-reflect on and identify the standards, or regulations, that he or she currently 
endorses.203 Manion argues that shame can contribute to individual transformations in that 
shame can make us aware of whether we agree with the values that made us feel shame. Since 
Henriksen and Mesel specifies that shame does not give us any information about what to do 
or not to do, their view on Manion would be that the shame which forces us to undergo an 
individual transformation, does not give us any information on which direction the individual 
transformation should go. So, shame is only helpful in telling us that something is wrong and 
can motivate us to intensely self-reflect and undergo change, but “shame does not in itself 
provide us with genuine moral insight.”204 The individual transformations do not guarantee a 
genuine moral transformation even though it has the potential to “occasionally mediate it.”205 
It is because of this uncertainty regarding shame’s transformative power that Henriksen and 
Mesel acknowledge its presence, while also arguing that shame should have minimal space.  
On Henriksen and Mesel’s argument, I can recognise that Manion’s notion of 
transformative power of shame can point to a more uncertain aspect of understanding the moral 
self. I would add that shame’s transformative power might be considered moral where we only 
see in hindsight if what we did and who we are makes us good or bad. In defence of Manion, I 
argue that when shame makes us aware that something is wrong and it makes us self-reflect, it 
might not provide a clear answer about whether what I did was bad or not, but it can give a 
 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid., 334.  
203 Jennifer C. Manion, “The Moral Relevance of Shame,” American Philosophical Quarterly 39, no 1 (2002): 
84. 
204 204 Jan Olav Henriksen and Terje Mesel, “Shame and Morality,” in Shame’s Unwelcome Interruption and 
Responsive Movements. Body, Religion, Morality – an Interdisciplinary Study (NOASP, Cappelen Damm 
Akademisk, 2021), 334. 
205 Ibid., 295. 
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sense of it, and it can provide for more introspection that can help us going forward as 
individuals. When we feel shame, we ought to explore why we feel shame. Even though we 
might not get a definite answer about why we feel shame, if what we feel shame about is right 
or wrong, and what we should do going forward, we might get a sense of what we should do. 
My suggestion here might be criticised as a guessing game. Even so, experience can teach us 
what might be the good thing to do. When we look back at our own and other’s actions and 
ways of being, we can use that as a standard to guide our future actions. I do not say that it 
should be the only way to base behaviour, but that it could be a way of understanding how 
moral shame might be useful even though it does not provide for distinct answers. For instance, 
let us say Sally encounters another injustice where someone is being verbally attacked. When 
she witnessed Edgar being robbed, she felt ashamed for not helping, even though she was not 
able to help him. After reflecting on her shame and concluding that her behaviour in Edgar’s 
situation did not reflect what kind of person she wanted to be, she decided to be better and help 
to the best of her ability in any future event.  
Now, a person is being verbally attacked and Sally is witnessing it. Because she has 
learnt from a previous incident of shame, she now decides to speak up and support the victim 
in this situation. Her previous experience and self-reflect on shame have transformed her as a 
person. Regardless of the size of the transformation, she has used previous shame to help guide 
her future behaviour. This has real merit, especially for the person that was verbally attacked. 
Sometimes we might make choices based on previous occasions where we felt shame that led 
to a bad outcome. Perhaps there were factors in the previous situation that we had not 
encountered before or did not have enough knowledge about that influenced our decision. I do 
not think these uncertainties will dismiss moral shame as a guiding behaviour altogether. Being 
aware of uncertainties and learning from previous decisions can be steppingstones for our future 
choices. 
Even though Henriksen and Mesel methodologically explore different aspects of moral 
shame, they do not extensively discuss guilt. Concerning guilt, their focus is that it helps 
separate the agent from the action. They conclude that because moral shame does not provide 
enough information about moral behaviour, moral guilt is the better option and moral shame 
should have minimal space. I find that they do not explore or challenge whether moral guilt 
sufficiently covers enough grounds for information on how to behave morally. As we have seen 
with O’Hear’s argumentation for honour and shame, and as I have argued through my example 
of Sally and Manion’s transformative power of shame, moral shame helps accounts for moral 
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behaviour that moral guilt does not adequately account for alone. So, even though Henriksen 
and Mesel make valid points, moral shame might have more space than just minimal. 
 
Moral Shame and Gender 
Since my thesis deals with how shame shapes normative ideals of expressing gendered 
subjectivities, I will now look at how and if moral shame can be a guide for gendered 
expressions of normative ideals. My claim is that shame can falsely present itself as moral when 
it comes to gendered ideals. I will show this by going through Lamb’s morality and 
responsibility, O’Hear’s morality and honour, and Henriksen and Mesel’s argument that moral 
shame only tells us that something is wrong, not necessarily what and why something is wrong. 
I will examine each of these three perspectives in relation to gendered ideals of subjectivity.  
 Lamb specifically focuses on responsibility as a moral notion. According to Lamb we 
are morally accountable for acquiring abilities we ought to have.206 However, he also claims 
that essential to morality is an action where only you bring a state upon yourself and not 
others.207 Because of this, he claims only guilt is essentially connected to morality. Others 
cannot put you in a state of guilt, but they can put you in a state of shame. In light of this, shame 
is only contingently connected to morality. Since it is a matter of chance whether shame is 
connected to morality, Lamb claims that moral shame is a confusion.208  If moral shame is a 
confusion, then our gendered expressions seem to have little moral significance when 
examining if shame can be a moral guid for our gendered behaviour. Since shame is a painful 
awareness of oneself as falling short of an expected standard or ideal perpetuated by societal 
norms,209 then it does not morally matter if your gender expression meets the standards and 
ideals of societal norms.  
On Lamb’s argument, the way you express your gender does not define if you are a good 
or a bad person. However, even though it would not matter morally, it does not take away from 
shame’s successful way in regulating social behaviour. We might think that we are a better 
person if we follow societal ideas of gender expressions, but that is not necessarily true. Even 
though shame falsely presents itself as moral, shame still brings forth feelings of inferiority and 
 
206 R.E. Lamb, “Guilt, Shame, and Morality,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43, no. 3 (1983): 329-
341. 
207 Ibid., 339. 
208 Ibid., 346. 
209 Jennifer C. Manion, “Girls Blush, Sometimes: Gender, Moral Agency, and the Problem of Shame,” Hypatia 
18, no. 3 (2003): 21. 
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shame still brings the potential consequences of feeling less than we ought to be. Even though 
some recognise that we are not good or bad if we choose to wear a skirt or pants regardless of 
our gender, there are others in society who thinks such genderbending choices will matter; 
others who think that you are not a good man, that you have some sort of perversion, if you put 
on clothes that are traditionally women’s clothes. When perpetually shamed for not following 
society’s gender norms and giving gender norms moral value, risk of suicide and other types of 
self-harm increases, lower self-esteem and sense of self-worth can follow. Regardless of 
whether or not we recognise that these actions and ways of expressing gender do not define you 
as a morally good person, portraying them as moral highlight the pervasiveness of shame in 
regulating our behaviour. So, to avoid feeling shame, many will follow societal ideals of 
expressing gendered subjectivities in order to avoid feeling shame and be labelled as an outcast, 
a person of lesser worth. This speaks to Lamb’s claim that shame can be a successful way of 
regulating behaviour despite not necessarily being moral.  
However, Lamb does point out that we are morally responsible for acquiring abilities. 
If we define gender as an ability, then we could be morally accountable for our gender if our 
gender ability only brings shame upon ourselves. Gender as an ability could mean your skill at 
performing your gender role. If you are a woman your intellectual or nurturing ability could be 
claimed to be different than a man’s. On this understanding of gender, it could be said that 
moral shame can be a guide for gendered behaviour. However, others would be able to put you 
to shame if you did not adhere to your gender role, and in this regard, shame would not be the 
morally right emotion. Instead, this might be more of a case for guilt, but that does necessarily 
not mean gender is a moral behaviour. Furthermore, such an understanding of gender could be 
used as justification for limiting people’s freedom based on gender, as is the case with the Saudi 
women who were not allowed to drive.  
 O’Hear uses the notion of honour when examining moral shame. In his account of the 
less socially dependent form of honour, he connects honour to a shame without ties to fear of 
public exposure, but rather involving ideals that contribute to personal growth.210 In this case 
of honour, you act according to ideals of what is considered good because you recognise the 
ideals as good. On O’Hear’s argument, shame is morally relevant in regulating expressions of 
gendered subjectivities if you value the gendered ideals as morally good; if you think they will 
contribute to you being an honourable person. It might be that gendered ways of expressing 
 
210 Anthony O’Hear, “Guilt and Shame as Moral Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1976-
1977): 81. 
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behaviour are morally good, but I would claim that tying them strictly to different sexes or 
genders for expressions is not a case of morality. For instance, I do not think that it is a case of 
morality to say that only women who can be nurturing and if they are not nurturing, they are 
not morally good. However, if we label certain forms of showing love as feminine, for instance 
motherly love, then that form of expressing love can be labelled as gendered. Here, motherly 
love does not have to belong strictly to females or mothers alone. Males can emulate motherly 
love into their own way of expressing love. It is important to note that I do not think that this 
type of love necessitates that you lead an honourable life. It could be that someone has a 
personal honour code where they think that specific gendered ideals come from a higher 
authority that they value.  
O’Hear also points out that gendered ideals are problematic. He states that “[i]n practice, 
a man’s honour has usually been seen in the light of his membership of a particular group… 
This has led if not actually to exaggerated concentration on the machismo aspect of honour, to 
a rather wooden and at times inhumane interpretation of honour.”211 By restricting a man or 
woman’s honour to specific gendered ideals, what it means to be good can be inhumane. It 
restricts the individual to specific ideals they can recognise as good depending on their gender. 
This would also restrict the personal growth they could achieve while trying to follow ideals 
they find honourable. They would only be able to grow as moral human beings in gender-
specific ways. This is not what O’Hear intended and if what is morally good depends on what 
gender you are, we move further away from a society that provides as much equal opportunities 
for all genders as it possibly can.  
 Henriksen and Mesel claim that shame ought to have minimal space in society because 
it does not provide us with much moral insight. They claim that shame does not give us 
information about what or why something is shameful or wrong. Instead, shame provides us 
with information that something is wrong, since it makes us aware that we have not met an 
expectation or ideal.212 In light of Henriksen and Mesel’s analysis, shame would not provide us 
with much useful information regarding what is wrong with not meeting the gendered ideal or 
why we have not met a gendered ideal. Shame would mainly tell us that we have not met a 
gendered ideal. For instance, in a heteronormative relationship, a woman is often expected to 
be sexually submissive while a man is expected to be sexually dominant. If a woman takes 
 
211 Ibid., 82. Emphasis in original.  
212Jan Olav Henriksen and Terje Mesel, “Shame and Morality,” in Shame’s Unwelcome Interruption and 
Responsive Movements. Body, Religion, Morality – an Interdisciplinary Study (NOASP, Cappelen Damm 
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charge of her sexuality, expresses it with confidence, initiates sex frequently and with many 
partners, she is often characterised to be more like a man than a woman. Further, she is often 
characterised and shamed as an impure woman with loose morals. Shame informs her that she 
has not met the expectation of what is means to be a woman sexually. On Henriksen and Mesel’s 
argument, we do not get any substantial moral information as to why it is shameful for a woman 
to be sexually dominant, why a woman is impure if she has several sex partners, but a man is 
celebrated for the same reason. Because shame does not give us substantial information about 
why we should be ashamed, it does not sufficiently provide us with information about what is 
shameful. On the surface, we get an answer to it: the shameful act is sleeping with several 
partner. However, others can disagree and say that it is not shameful. Instead, they can say it is 
empowering that she takes charge of her sexuality and has as many sexual partners as she would 
like.213 I would say that it is not morally bad of her to have several sex partners and that it is not 
morally good. How many sex partners she has says nothing about her morality and the same 
goes for how many sex partners men have. On Henriksen and Mesel’s argument, shame does 
not say on a moral basis what is and is not shameful regarding gender ideals of expressing 
subjectivity.  Shame falsely present itself as a moral regulator in expressing gendered ideals of 
subjectivity when it socially regulates expressions of gendered subjectivities. When adding the 
aspect of morality to gender ideals, there is a hightened expectation to behaviour compared to 
social pressure without the moral aspect. Social pressure should not be taken lightly, but 
morality, even when it is a false morality, puts more pressure on individuals regarding 
expectations for gendered behaviours.  
 
Summary 
In this chapter I have explored moral shame and guilt. I have analysed moral shame in relation 
to gendered expressions of subjectivity. Lamb argues that guilt and not shame is essentially tied 
to morality since he explores responsibility as a central notion of morality. He therefore 
concludes that we ought to rely on guilt as a moral system. However, Lamb mainly explores 
responsibility and does not account for other notions that can be central to morality. O’Hear 
looks at honour as a central notion to morality and argues that guilt alone cannot account for all 
aspects of morality. He argues that shame can explain aspects of morality that guilt cannot. 
O’Hear has a very legalistic definition of guilt which depends on reprimand or punishment. In 
 
213 With consent, of course. 
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light of his definition of guilt he claims that since honour is not dependent on reprimand or 
punishment, shame accounts for morality in ways guilt cannot. A person does what is 
honourable because the person recognises the ideals and values as good, not because an external 
law or authority told us it is right. Through honour, O’Hear claims we strive to uphold ideals 
for personal growth instead of fear of public exposure. Furthermore, moral shame can provide 
an internal motivation for doing what is good. I have demonstrated how O’Hear’s account of 
honour in relation to shame can be problematic since an honour code could be another form of 
authority. Understanding honour as another form of authority, it can also be connected with 
guilt. I have highlighted that his account of honour, shame, and guilt, show that shame and guilt 
can be difficult to separate as they can often occur simultaneously. Even though they are 
difficult to separate, shame can account for aspects of morality which guilt cannot. But this does 
not exclude the one or the other as morally irrelevant.  
 Henriksen and Mesel argues that shame does not provide us with any moral insight. 
Shame tells us that something is wrong, but not what is wrong and why it is wrong. Because of 
the lack of moral information from shame, they conclude that shame ought to have minimal 
space in society. However, they do acknowledge that shame can have positive aspects through 
Manion’s transformative power of shame. Manion argues that shame forces individuals to 
intensely self-reflect about their values and ideals that they have internalised. Still, Henriksen 
and Mesel conclude that guilt ought to be the basis for guiding moral behaviour since shame 
does not provide a clear answer to what and why something is shameful. I illustrated that even 
though morality based on guilt can be a guide for moral behaviour, morality based on shame in 
light of Manion’s transformative power can provide some insight into how we ought to behave. 
However, the moral insight on what to do and how to be does not provide an immediate answer 
to whether it is the right or good thing to do. We can use our previous experiences to guide our 
future behaviour. Previous moments where we have experienced shame that made us reflect on 
our ideals and values can provide a background for what to do in the future. However, we might 
not know immediately if the act was good or bad, and we might end up doing something we 
meant as good but turned out to be bad. In this case, our bad action can provide a new 
opportunity to reflect on and provide new insight for future behaviour.  
 Lastly, I have gone through the different aspects of moral shame explored in this chapter 
and examined if they can provide a backdrop for morally regulating expressions of gendered 
subjectivities. I have highlighted how shame falsely present expressions of gendered 
subjectivities as a moral notion, but that shame still regulates our gendered subjectivities in light 
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